BARON ELLIS BLOODWORTH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bloodworth appeals his probation revocation sentence of 19.3 years. The court reverses and remands, holding that under the 1997 youthful offender statute, a trial court may impose only up to 364 days in a specified facility upon probation revocation following successful completion of boot camp, not the full original sentence.
Under the 1997 youthful offender statute, when probation is revoked following successful boot camp completion, the trial court may impose only up to 364 days incarceration in a specified facility, not the original sentence or the initial probation term. The statute limits the court to sentences that might have been imposed 'as a condition of probation,' which section 958.04(2)(b) restricts to 364 days maximum.
[1] Upon revocation of probation for a youthful offender who successfully completed a boot camp program, the trial court is limited to imposing a sentence of incarceration no…
[2] A youthful offender statute mandating modification of a sentence to probation upon satisfactory completion of a basic training program does not alter the sentencing limit…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the offender violates the conditions of probation, the court may revoke probation and impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed as a condition of probation.”
The controlling statutory language from section 958.045(5)(c) that limits sentencing upon probation revocation to sentences that might have been imposed as a condition of probation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBloodworth was originally sentenced as a youthful offender to 6 years incarceration with 2 years suspended, conditioned on 2 years' probation. His sen…
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WHATLEY, Acting Chief Judge.
Baron Bloodworth appeals the sentence he received upon the revocation of his probation. The State concedes that the sentence is erroneous, but the State and Bloodworth disagree as to the sentence Bloodworth should have received. We conclude that neither party’s position is correct and reverse and remand for resentencing.
Bloodworth was originally sentenced as a youthful offender to 6 years’ incarceration, 2 years suspended, in lieu of which he was to serve 2 years’ probation. His sentence was modified to 4 years’ probation pursuant to section 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1997).
That statute mandates that the trial court modify a youth’s sentence to probation upon receipt of a report from the Department of Corrections indicating that the youth satisfactorily performed the basic training program. Bloodworth subsequently violated probation, his probation was revoked, and the trial court sentenced him to 19.3 years’ incarceration. Bloodworth contends that the trial court was limited to sentencing him to 2 years upon revocation of his probation, and the State contends that the trial court could have sentenced him to the original 6 years. Our reading of the youthful offender statute leads us to conclude that neither of these contentions is correct.
Section 958.045(5)(c) of the youthful offender statute specifically provides that “[i]f the offender violates the conditions of probation, the court may revoke probation and impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed as a condition of probation.” Section 958.04(2)(b) specifies that a court may impose as a condition of probation a period of incarceration not exceeding 364 days “in a county facility, a department probation and restitution center, or a community residential facility which is owned and operated by any public or private entity providing such services.” Thus, by the plain language of the youthful offender statute, upon violating probation imposed after successful completion of boot camp, a youth may only receive up to 364 days in a specified facility as a penalty.
The three cases cited by the parties that involved youthful offender sentences similar to Bloodworth’s are not applicable because they involved the 1991 version of the youthful offender statute. See Dunson v. State, 701 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Fayson v. State, 678 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). That version provided that “[i]f the offender violates the conditions of probation, the court may revoke probation and impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed.” § 958.04(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1991).
Thus, the courts in the above-cited cases reversed and remanded with directions that the youths be sentenced to the original prison terms with credit for time served. As can be seen, the 1991 version of the statute did not limit a trial court, as the 1997 version of the statute does, to “any sentence that it might have originally imposed as a condition of probation.” § 958.045(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis supplied).1 The reason for this change in section 958.045(5)(e) is unknown to us, and our review of the legislative history of the statute provided no insight. We are compelled to follow the plain meaning of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that Bloodworth be sentenced to no more than 364 days in a specified facility with credit for time served.
Reversed and remanded.
SALCINES, J„ and DANAHY, PAUL W. (SENIOR) JUDGE, Concur. . The 1999 version of the statute is identical to the 1997 version in this respect. § 958.045(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999).
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Cited By (23 total)
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Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…958.045(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). If a youthful offender who has successfully completed boot camp subsequently violates the probation that follows, the trial court may impose a period of incarceration not to exceed 364 days. See Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); see also § 958.04(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). There are two ways by which a defendant can become entitled to the benefits of the youthful offender statute. Either the trial court can sentence the defendant as a youthful offender,…
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Blaxton v. State, 868 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…dential facility which is owned and operated by any public or private entity providing such services.... Placement in such a facility or center shall not exceed 364 days. Based upon these two provisions, this court concluded in Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), that a youthful offender who had successfully completed boot camp, had his sentence modified to a term of probation, and then violated probation could not receive a sentence of more than 364 days’ incarceration because that is th…1 / 2
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Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…ng a youthful offender, a court may impose as a condition of probation a period of incarceration not to exceed 364 days. Taken together, these statutes limit Appellant’s sentence to no greater than 364 days of incarceration. See Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The state’s argument that these provisions do not apply to Appellant because he was originally sentenced as an adult fails in light of this Court’s recent decision in Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The st…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnson v. State, 574 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Fayson v. State, 678 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Dunson v. State, 701 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)