LOUIS ALEXANDER MASON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mason appeals his sentence of concurrent 48-month terms of incarceration, arguing it violates statutory limits for youthful offenders who complete boot camp and subsequently violate probation. The court agrees and reverses, holding that such offenders are limited to a maximum of 364 days of incarceration upon probation violation.
A youthful offender who successfully completes boot camp and is placed on probation is limited to a maximum sentence of 364 days of incarceration upon probation violation, even if the violation involves committing a new law offense. The statutory limitations in sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b) control over the general probation violation statutes.
[1] A youthful offender who successfully completes boot camp, is placed on probation, and subsequently violates that probation may be given any sentence which the court might…
[2] In sentencing a youthful offender, a court may impose as a condition of probation a period of incarceration not to exceed 364 days.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant's sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory limitations set forth by sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes.”
Establishes the legal violation and basis for reversal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMason was originally sentenced as an adult to probation. Upon violating that probation, he was re-sentenced as a youthful offender with a recommendati…
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BROWNING, J.
In this direct appeal, Appellant challenges his sentence of two concurrent terms of 48 months of incarceration on the grounds that it exceeds the maximum penalty of 364 days of incarceration for youthful offenders who were sentenced to probation upon completion of boot camp and thereafter violated that probation. We agree and reverse.
Appellant was originally sentenced as an adult to probation; upon violation, he was sentenced as a youthful offender, with a recommendation that he complete a basic training program for youthful offenders, known generally as “boot camp” and provided for in section 958.04, Florida Statutes. Appellant successfully completed boot camp and, as a result, was released from jail and placed on probation for two years. He thereafter violated that probation by committing a new law offense, and was given the sentence he now challenges.
Appellant’s sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory limitations set forth by sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes. See State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla.1998). Section 958.045(5)(c) states that a youthful offender who successfully completes boot camp, is placed on probation, and subsequently violates that probation may be given any sentence which the court might originally have imposed. Section 958.04(2)(b) states that, in sentencing a youthful offender, a court may impose as a condition of probation a period of incarceration not to exceed 364 days. Taken together, these statutes limit Appellant’s sentence to no greater than 364 days of incarceration. See Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
The state’s argument that these provisions do not apply to Appellant because he was originally sentenced as an adult fails in light of this Court’s recent decision in Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The state’s argument that these provisions do not apply to Appellant because he violated his probation by committing a new law offense also fails because the general statements reflected in sections 958.14 and 948.06, Florida Statutes, to the effect that probation violators may not be sentenced to a longer term than the maximum sentence for the underlying offense are superceded by the more specific provisions set forth in sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b). See State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 112 (Fla. 2002) (approving of this Court’s application of the rule of statutory construction that the specific statute controls over the general statute).
Accordingly, we REVERSE Appellant’s sentences and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
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Fettler v. State, 885 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…on of the subsequent period of probation. See, e.g., Mims v. State, 871 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (citing §§ 958.04(2)(b), 958.045(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2003)); Blaxton v. State, 868 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). It is similarly well-established that an appellant is “always entitled to prison credit previously…
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Bryant v. State, 876 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…ot override the specific provisions of the Act. We do not address the claim, improperly raised by Bryant for the first time in this appeal, that he successfully completed boot camp and may not be sentenced in excess of 364 days. See Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Bryant must first raise this issue in the trial court. The trial court erred in denying the motion to correct illegal sentence. We reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. FARMER, C.J., KLEIN and…
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Adderly v. State, 958 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…(Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Holmes v. State, 899 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Lee v. State, 884 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Mims v. State, 871 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Blaxton v. State, 868 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Mason v. State, 864 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Lawson v. State, 845 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Williams v. State, 841 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Burkett v. State, 816 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Geri v. Stat…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998)
- State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2002)
- Baron Ellis Bloodworth v. State, 769 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Thomas v. State, 825 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)