JAKE MURRAY, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court approved a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision affirming a Prison Releasee Reoffender Act sentence, resolving a conflict with a Second District decision. The court held that previously decided constitutional and procedural challenges to the Act do not apply to Murray's case.
The Act does not violate the constitutional principles Murray raises. Defendants have the right to present evidence of ineligibility and challenge the state's evidence of eligibility, notice is provided through publication in the Laws of Florida, and the Act does not violate separation of powers, due process, equal protection, the single subject rule, vagueness doctrine, or the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
[1] A defendant has the right to present evidence to prove ineligibility for sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and to challenge the State's evidence of elig…
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers or due process by allowing a "victim veto" that precludes its application.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State's evidence regarding the defendant's eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender”
Establishes the procedural rights defendants possess when challenged with Prison Releasee Reoffender Act sentencing
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJake Murray, Jr. was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. He challenged the Act on multiple const…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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LEWIS, J.
We have for review the decision in State v. Murray, 732 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Murray makes numerous challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”), all on grounds that have been addressed by this Court in other opinions. See McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act, and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing-that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 189, 142 (Fla.1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a “victim veto” that precludes application of the Act, as well as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment). Accordingly, the decision in Murray is approved to the extent it is consistent with Cotton,
Ellis, McKnight, and Grant.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. See § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).
. The district court, in affirming Murray's sentence, cites to Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla.1999). In Cotton, we disapproved the decision in Speed to the extent that it was inconsistent with our opinion in Cotton.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 358-59 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)
- Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Jerry v. State, 732 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)