RONALD J. FUSSELL, HUSBAND, APPELLANT,
v.
REBECCA J. FUSSELL, WIFE, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, a former husband challenges a trial court order restricting his telephonic visitation with his minor son and limiting his ability to withdraw the child from school. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that the restrictions were reasonable interpretations of the original custody agreement's vague telephonic communication provision.
The trial court did not err. The court's restrictions on telephonic visitation represented a reasonable interpretation and clarification of the final judgment's provision for 'open and reasonable telephonic communication' rather than a modification. The restrictions on school withdrawals were supported by competent, substantial evidence of a material change in circumstances and the child's best interests.
[1] A trial court may clarify or interpret provisions regarding telephonic visitation in a final judgment, rather than modify them, to ensure reasonable communication in the…
[2] Restrictions on a non-custodial parent's telephonic communication with a child are permissible when the frequency of calls disrupts the custodial parent's quality time wi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that the trial court did not modify, but rather interpreted and clarified the final judgment's telephonic visitation provision.”
Establishes the court's key distinction that the order was a clarification rather than a modification of the original custody judgment
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband called his ex-wife's residence every morning at 7:30 a.m. and in the afternoons, and called once or twice even on evenings when he …
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POLSTON, J.
Appellant, Ronald J. Fussell (former husband), appeals from an Order on Motions of Former Husband and Former Wife for Modification, Clarification and Enforcement. The former husband argues the trial court erred by (i) restricting his telephone visitation with the parties’ minor son, and (ii) restricting the instances of withdrawing the son from school. We affirm.
During a hearing, appellee Rebecca J. Fussell (former wife), described the former husband’s calling patterns since their dissolution of marriage. She testified that the former husband calls her residence every morning at approximately 7:30 a.m., and in the afternoons. Even on nights that the former husband has the child until 8:00 p.m., he calls the former wife’s residence once or twice after dropping the child off. The former wife claimed that the frequent phone calls disrupt her quality time with the child.
With regard to the former husband’s telephonic visitation, the trial court found his daily calls to the former wife’s residence to be “unreasonable.” The trial court ruled the former husband can call the child on Sundays between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and he can call once during the week on a day and time agreed to by the parties. Furthermore, the parties can alter those times through a written agreement, and the trial court placed no limits on the child calling the father. We hold that the trial court did not modify, but rather interpreted and clarified the final judgment’s telephonic visitation provision. See Brown v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(affirming a trial court order by concluding the order was a clarification of the noncustodial parent’s visitation rights rather than a modification).
The final judgment stated, “[wjhen the child is with one parent, the other parent shall have open and reasonable telephonic communication with the child.” During the hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court stated that, “[t]he Court has the duty to see what is in the best interest of this child, and the Court is obviously having to interpret some of the provisions, like what is reasonable communication, which the Court is literally going to have to do.”
The Court believes that the former husband’s interest in his son and his dedication to being an active father is commendable. However, the trial court’s restrictions are reasonable. The former wife should be allowed to enjoy a life with her son without the constant interruptions of disruptive phone calls from the former husband. Significantly, the trial court ordered that the son could call his father without any restrictions. Although it was implied at oral argument that the former wife may prevent the son from calling his father, there is no evidence that the former wife will disregard the court’s ruling.
The former wife challenged the former husband’s withdrawal of the son from school for recreational purposes. The wife testified that after these withdrawals, her son had a negative attitude towards school. There was competent, substantial evidence of a material change in circumstances since the dissolution of marriage and that the child’s best interests would be promoted by the change. See Buttermore v. Meyer, 559 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Lane v. Lane, 599 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)(holding that appellate court could not substitute its opinion for the trier of fact’s regarding visitation rights).
Affirmed.
BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Roque v. Paskow, 812 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ew benefit for one party. See Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). On the other hand, a clarification does not seek to change rights and obligations but to make a judgment more clear and precise. See Fussell v. Fussell, 778 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Finally, the construction of a final judgment presents a question of law for the court, see Boynton v. Canal Auth., 311 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), and we may review it de novo on appeal. As we read the original f…
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Pomeranz v. Ina T. Pomeranz, 961 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…eks a new benefit for one party. Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). On the other hand, a clarification does not seek to change rights and obligations, but to make a judgment more clear and precise. Fussell v. Fussell, 778 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). In order for the trial court to modify a final judgment, the moving party must present the issue by appropriate pleadings. McDonald v. McDonald, 732 So. 2d 505, 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). To obtain modification, a party must…
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Grasso v. Mulholland, 835 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ase, it appears to us that the court was, in essence, interpreting and clarifying the parties’ agreement, incorporated into the decree of dissolution, with regard to the parties’ visitation schedule with their three children. See Fussell v. Fussell, 778 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Roque v. Paskow, 812 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 746 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The trial court found that the provision in the settlement that the former husband have not “less than” the times…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Buttermore v. Meyer, 559 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Lane v. Lane, 599 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Arlice Ellis Brown v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Transp. Refrigeration, Inc. v. Carey, 604 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)