MAURICE CHEVELLE CARTER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reviews Carter's sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, resolving a conflict between the Fifth and Second District Courts of Appeal. The court affirms Carter's conviction and sentence, holding that the Act is constitutional and does not violate ex post facto, due process, separation of powers, or vagueness principles.
The court approved Carter's sentence to the extent it is consistent with its prior decisions in Cotton, Ellis, McKnight, and Grant. The Act does not violate ex post facto, equal protection, double jeopardy, separation of powers, or due process principles, and does not violate vagueness doctrine. Defendants have the right to present evidence and challenge the State's evidence regarding eligibility for sentencing under the Act.
[1] A defendant has the right to present evidence to prove ineligibility for sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and to challenge the State's evidence regardi…
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate ex post facto principles, the single subject rule, equal protection, or double jeopardy.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State's evidence regarding the defendant's eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender”
Establishes that defendants retain procedural rights to challenge their eligibility under the Act and present exculpatory evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaurice Chevelle Carter was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. Carter challenged his sentence on multi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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LEWIS, J.
We have for review Carter v. State, 730 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Carter was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”). He challenges his sentence on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by this Court in other opinions. See McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act, and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffen-der); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act, and holding that the Act neither violates the single subject rule for legislation, nor does it violate principles of equal protection or subject defendants sentenced under it to double jeopardy); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act does not violate separation of powers, is not void for vagueness, and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a “victim veto” precluding application of the Act). Accordingly, the decision in Carter is approved to the extent it is consistent with Cotton,
Ellis, McKnight, and Grant.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. See § 775.082(8), Fla.Stat. (1997).
. The district court, in affirming Carter’s sentence, cites to Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (Fla.1999). In Cotton, we disapproved the decision in Speed to the extent that it was inconsistent with our opinion in Cotton.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 358-59 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)
- Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Taylor v. State, 730 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)