LORENZO SPEED, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed Speed's challenge to his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, holding that the Act does not violate separation of powers, is not void for vagueness, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not give victims a veto over mandatory sentences. The Court approved Speed's lower court decision only to the extent it was consistent with prior precedent.
The Court held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers, is not void for vagueness, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, does not grant victims a veto over mandatory sentences, does not violate ex post facto principles, does not violate the single subject rule, and does not violate equal protection. All of Speed's challenges to the Act fail.
[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers.
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not void for vagueness.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we disapproved of the Fifth District's decision in Speed to the extent that it implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives to each victim a veto over the imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of the Act”
Establishes that victims do not have veto power over mandatory sentencing under the Act
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpeed was sentenced under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. He challenged his sentence on multiple grounds, including claims that the Act viol…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Present Evidence cases and more on FLexlaw
LEWIS, J.
We have for review the decision in Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Speed challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (“the Act”)1 on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by previous opinions of this Court. For instance, in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000), we disapproved of the Fifth District’s' decision in Speed to the extent that it implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives to each victim a veto over the imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of the Act. See Cotton, 769 So. 2d at 357-58. In Cotton we also held that the Act does not violate separation of powers; moreover, we held that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment.
Speed’s other challenges to the Act also fail. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912, 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991)). Accordingly, the decision in Speed is approved to the extent that it is consistent with Cotton, Ellis, McKnight, and Grant.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ„ concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 358-59 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Abrams v. State, 971 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…at 589; W.J. v. State, 688 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The supreme court has also rejected this same notice argument when raised against the prison releasee reoffender statute, which also does not require written notice. See Speed v. State, 779 So. 2d 265 (Fla.2001). As the DSFO Act was passed prior to Abrams’s commission of the second offenses, he was on notice of the increased penalty attached to his criminal conduct. Abrams also had notice and an opportunity to be heard on his sentence. Florida R…
-
Bedford v. State, 780 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2001)…NTE, JJ, concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion. . See § 775.082(9), Fla. Slat. (Supp.1998). . In its decision in Bedford, the Fifth District cited to its decision in Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, No. SC95706, 779 So. 2d 265 (Fla.2001), and certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wise, 744 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), quashed, 762 So. 2d 523 (Fla.2000), and State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), quashed, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). In our decis…
-
Coulson v. State, 777 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 2001)…e have for review the decision in Coulson v. State, 745 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), in which the Fifth District, in affirming the decision of the trial court, relied on its decision in Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, 779 So. 2d 265 (Fla.2001), but certified conflict with State v. Wise, 744 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), quashed, 762 So. 2d 523 (Fla.2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently held that the Prisoner Re-leasee Reoffender Act do…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)
- Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Jewell F. Raimondo v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- State v. Cotton, 728 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)