CHRIS MEARNS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-08-26
No. 97-00474
BLUE, A.C.J., QUINCE and CASANUEVA, JJ„ Concur.
779 So. 2d 282 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*283] PER CURIAM.

Chris Mearns appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to numerous violations of probation ranging from failure to make restitution payments, to narcotics possession. After his probation was revoked and he was resen-tenced, Mearns sought to withdraw his pleas, arguing he was unaware that the trial court could impose a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation. This is not a legal basis for allowing Mearns to withdraw his plea, since after revoking Mearns’ probation the court was free to impose any sentence it may have originally imposed before placing him on probation. We affirm the denial of the motion to withdraw pleas. See § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1987); Williams v. State, 629 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

We remand, however, to correct an error in Mearns’ written sentence in circuit court case no. 94-927F. The trial court orally pronounced a sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment with credit for time served. The sentencing documents in that case reflect a sentence of 113.4 months and must be corrected to conform with the court’s oral pronouncement. See Matthews v. State, 578 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). All sentences imposed in the remaining cases are affirmed.

BLUE, A.C.J., QUINCE and CASANUEVA, JJ„ Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …rris v. State, 453 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). If the trial court revokes probation, it may impose any sentence it might initially have imposed. § 948.06(2)(b, e); Hill v. State, 927 So. 2d 1047, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). While, as stated above, we review the trial court’s finding of a willful and substantial violation for competent substantial evidence, our standard of review for the trial court’s decision to revoke probation is abuse of d…
  • Hill v. State, 927 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …osed from considering a youthful offender sentence on violation of probation. Upon revocation of a defendant’s probation, a trial court is “free to impose any sentence it may have originally imposed before placing him on probation.” Means v. State, 779 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing, upon revocation of probation, for the trial court to “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation”). The Fourt…
  • State v. Dewann L. Brown, 855 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …grand theft motor vehicle. Because the court could have originally imposed a youthful offender sentence, it was authorized to impose a youthful offender sentence upon the violation of probation. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat., (2002); See Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998) (after revoking defendant’s probation, trial court is free to impose any sentence it might have originally imposed before placing him on probation). The court’s stated ground for departure, therefore, was appropriate. . The tr…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw