NICHOLAS SHAWN HILL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Nicholas Shawn Hill appealed the revocation of his probation for two counts of lewd battery. The court affirmed the probation revocation but reversed his sentence, finding that the trial court erroneously believed it could not consider youthful offender sentencing upon probation revocation.
The court affirmed the revocation of Hill's probation based on competent, substantial evidence of willful and substantial violation. However, the court reversed Hill's sentence, holding that upon probation revocation, a trial court is free to impose any sentence it originally could have imposed, including youthful offender sentencing, regardless of the defendant's initial sentencing category.
[1] A trial court's order revoking probation will be affirmed if supported by competent, substantial evidence of willful and substantial violation.
[2] A discovery violation during probation revocation proceedings is harmless error if it does not affect the outcome of the proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Upon revocation of a defendant's probation, a trial court is 'free to impose any sentence it may have originally imposed before placing him on probation.'”
Establishes the fundamental principle that probation revocation restores the trial court's sentencing discretion to the original scope, not limited by the initial sentencing category.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHill was originally sentenced as an adult to a year and a day in prison followed by ten years' probation pursuant to a plea agreement. Upon revocation…
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SILBERMAN, Judge.
Nicholas Shawn Hill appeals the revocation of his probation and resulting sentence for two counts of lewd battery. We affirm the order revoking Hill’s probation but reverse Hill’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
We first note that the State presented competent, substantial evidence that Hill willfully and substantially violated his probation. As to Hill’s argument concerning an alleged discovery violation, our review of the record reflects that any violation was harmless. See Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138, 1141, 2006 WL 345025 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2006) (citing State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (Fla.1995)).
Hill correctly contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to over fifteen years’ imprisonment when the trial court was under the mistaken belief that Hill was not eligible for youthful offender sentencing. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hill was originally sentenced as an adult to a year and a day in prison, to be followed by ten years’ probation. The trial court believed that because Hill was originally sentenced to prison as an adult, the court was foreclosed from considering a youthful offender sentence on violation of probation.
Upon revocation of a defendant’s probation, a trial court is “free to impose any sentence it may have originally imposed before placing him on probation.” Means v. State, 779 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing, upon revocation of probation, for the trial court to “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation”). The Fourth District cited section 948.06(2)(b) and Means. in Williams v. State, 889 So. 2d.969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). There, the defendant was placed on probation as an adult, and upon revocation of probation, “the trial court was under the mistaken belief that it could not impose a youthful offender sentence because the original probation was not a youthful offender sentence.” Id. at 970. The Fourth District reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether to impose a youthful offender sentence but noted that the trial court remained “free to re-impose the existing sentence.” Id.
Thus, we reverse Hill’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court should consider youthful offender sentencing as one of its options.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ„ Concur.
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Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…02); Brown v. State, 455 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (citing Harris v. State, 453 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). If the trial court revokes probation, it may impose any sentence it might initially have imposed. § 948.06(2)(b, e); Hill v. State, 927 So. 2d 1047, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). While, as stated above, we review the trial court’s finding of a willful and substantial violation for competent substantial evidence, our standard of review…
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Burrell v. State, 993 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…it to electronic monitoring if deemed necessary by his community control or probation officer. Under these conditions, electronic monitoring could have been imposed on Burrell, even without the Act. See § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002); Hill v. State, 927 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (stating that, when a defendant violates probation, upon resentencing the trial court may impose any sentence it originally might have imposed without violating double jeopardy principles). However, in this case, the trial court…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995)
- Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006)
- Mearns v. State, 779 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)