GLORIA MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gloria Miller appeals her convictions for disorderly conduct, battery on a law enforcement officer, and obstructing an officer with violence following her arrest during a domestic disturbance call. The court reverses the disorderly conduct conviction because her verbal conduct was protected speech, but affirms the convictions for battery and obstruction because she was not justified in using force to resist arrest regardless of the arrest's legality.
The disorderly conduct conviction is reversed because Miller's purely verbal conduct was protected speech under the First Amendment and did not constitute fighting words or false statements creating a clear and present danger. The convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer and obstructing with violence are affirmed because a person is not justified in using force to resist arrest even if the arrest is illegal.
[1] Disorderly conduct statutes are narrowly construed to prohibit only words that inflict injury, tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, or falsely report a physic…
[2] Verbal conduct, even if loud and aggressive, is protected by the First Amendment unless it constitutes "fighting words" or falls within a narrow exception for false repor…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We construe the statute so that no words except "fighting words" or words like shouts of "fire" in a crowded theater fall within its proscription.”
Establishes the narrow construction of the disorderly conduct statute limiting its application to fighting words and similar dangerous speech.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiller was arrested in her home by an officer investigating a reported domestic disturbance. Her pre-arrest conduct consisted of loud and aggressive s…
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FULMER, Judge.
Gloria Miller appeals from her convictions for disorderly conduct, battery on a law enforcement officer, and obstructing an officer with violence. We find merit in her challenge to the disorderly conduct conviction and reverse as to that charge, but affirm as to the remaining charges.
Miller was arrested for disorderly conduct in her home by an officer who was sent to the scene to investigate a reported domestic disturbance. Miller’s pre-arrest conduct consisted of loud and aggressive speech, directing the arresting officer to remove her boyfriend from the residence. Miller argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove disorderly conduct because there was no evidence that her actions were more than a mere annoyance to those around her. The disorderly conduct statute provides: Whoever commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or engages in brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct as to constitute a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct, shall be guilty....
§ 877.03, Fla.Stat. (1997). The statute has been limited, however, in its application to words that:
“by their very utterance ... inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” (citations omitted) or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others. We construe the statute so that no words except “fighting words” or words like shouts of “fire” in a crowded theater fall within its proscription.
C.L.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1171, 1171-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting State v. Saunders, 389 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla.1976)).
Although protected speech can be rendered unprotected by a defendant’s additional physical actions, see C.L.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d at 1172, here, Miller’s conduct was entirely verbal until the officer initiated the arrest. Under the limited application of the statute, the trial court should have granted Miller’s motion for judgment of acquittal because her words were neither fighting words nor false words that created a clear and present danger of harm to others and, thus, were protected by the First Amendment. See id.; C.P. v. State, 644 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse the disorderly conduct conviction.
Miller argues that the convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer and obstructing with violence should also be reversed because the officer was not engaged in a lawful duty when the battery and obstruction occurred. We reject this argument because the violence perpetrated by Miller was in response to the officer’s attempt to arrest her. Therefore, section 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1997), which states that a person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest, applies here. Because the statute makes it unlawful to resist an arrest with violence even if the arrest is illegal, Miller was not justified in using force against the officer. Compare Taylor v. State, 740 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and DAVIS, J., concur.
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Barry v. State, 934 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…2d 3, 7 (Fla.1976), and Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla.1976)). Considering the statute as limited by Saunders, it is clear that speech alone will not generally support a conviction for disorderly conduct. For example, in Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), the defendant’s actions involved only loud and aggressive speech directed at a pólice officer who had come to her residence. This court reversed the conviction for disorderly conduct, noting that Miller’s conduct was entirely ver…
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Baymon v. State, 933 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…owded movie theatre. See State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla.1976) (limiting disorderly conduct statute, when applied purely to speech, to fighting words and false words that create a clear and present danger to others); see also Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); C.P. v. State, 644 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Baymon’s arrest was unlawful. Therefore, the law mandated suppression of the evidence seized in any search performed incident to that arrest. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 4…
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Authorities Cited
- Clauson Conway Taylor v. State, 740 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- C.L.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Simpson v. Parsons, 644 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- C.P. v. State, 644 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)