MICHAEL STEVEN NELSON,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Nelson appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, arguing he should have been informed that conviction would result in sexual predator/offender designation and registration requirements. The First District affirmed, holding that such designations are collateral consequences of conviction that need not be disclosed before accepting a plea.
The trial court did not err in denying Nelson's motion to withdraw his plea. Sexual predator/offender designations and registration requirements are collateral consequences that defendants need not be informed of before accepting a plea, and such non-disclosure does not render a plea involuntary absent affirmative misrepresentation.
[1] A defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea based on the failure to disclose collateral consequences of the conviction, such as registration as a sexual offende…
[2] The designation of a defendant as a sexual offender or predator under Florida Statutes is a collateral consequence of a conviction, not a direct one.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the reporting requirements under these provisions are collateral consequences that are not compelled to be disclosed to the defendant before the acceptance of his plea”
Establishes the core holding that sexual offender registration is a collateral consequence not requiring pre-plea disclosure
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNelson entered a guilty plea to sexual offenses without being informed by the trial court or defense counsel that he would be designated a sexual offe…
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PER CURIAM.
The issue before us is whether a trial court erred in disallowing a defendant from withdrawing a plea, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l), because neither the trial court nor defense counsel informed him that upon conviction, he would be designated a “sexual predator” or “sexual offender” under section 775.021 or 943.0435, Florida Statutes (1999).1 Appellant’s theory is that imposi tion of such provisions rendered the plea involuntary. We affirm the denial and agree with the lower court that the reporting requirements under these provisions are collateral consequences that are not compelled to be disclosed to the defendant before the acceptance of his plea.
Appellant, Michael Nelson, first claims he should have been informed of both the registration requirement and that his driver’s license would reveal the classification. We are in accord with other appellate districts which hold that a defendant need not be informed of these designations before entering a plea, because they are collateral, rather than direct, consequences resulting from his convictions of certain sexual offenses. See, e.g., Donovan v. State, 773 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Pearman v. State, 764 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Oce v. State, 742 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), cause dismissed, 763 So. 2d 1044 (Fla.2000); LaMonica v. State, 732 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Burkett v. State, 731 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Benitez v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
In a factually similar case, State v. Stapleton, 764 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to lewd assault, because he had not been informed that he would have to register as a sexual offender under section 943.0435, or that he was subject to commitment for treatment following his prison sentence under the Jimmy Ryce Act, sections 394.910 through 394.931, Florida Statutes (1999). The Fourth District acknowledged that the application of these provisions was a collateral consequence of the plea, yet affirmed the trial court’s discretion to determine that Stapleton should have been advised of them.
In our case, the trial court exercised its discretion by denying Nelson’s motion. The Second District has pointed out that publication of the sexual-predator or sexual-offender reporting statutes provides a defendant with sufficient notice of the consequences of a conviction. See Collie, 710 So. 2d at 1008; Burkett, 731 So. 2d at 698. Because Nelson did not allege any affirmative misrepresentation, but only the failure to advise him of a collateral consequence, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of Nelson’s motion to withdraw his plea did not result in manifest injustice. See Lopez v. State, 536 So. 2d 226 (Fla.1988).
Nelson also claims he should have been informed of the prohibition against being within 1,000 feet of a school or place where children congregate. We find no such prohibition in the Florida Statutes. Nelson did agree in the plea agreement to comply with the standard conditions of probation found in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes, which includes provisions prohibiting him from living or having unsupervised contact with minors within 1,000 feet of places where children congregate, or from working in such environments. Subject to this clarification, by specifically agreeing to these conditions of probation in his plea agreement, Nelson waived any objection thereto. See Allen v. State, 642 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, WEBSTER and LEWIS, JJ., concur. . The parties never clarify which reporting statute applies to Nelson. Our review of the provisions leads us to conclude that Nelson is required to be designated a sexual offender under section 943.0435, rather than sexual predator under section 775.021, because the terms of the latter do not apply to his convictions.
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State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2003)…PER CURIAM. We review Partlow v. State, 813 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which certified conflict with Nelson v. State, 780 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The issue is whether, after being sentenced for a sexual offense pursuant to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a defendant may withdraw his plea as involuntary because…
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Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…1000 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 722 So. 2d 192 (Fla.) and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So. 2d 1124 (Fla.1998); see also Nelson v. State, 780 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Donovan v. State, 773 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Thus the Legislature has declared the public policy of this state by enactment of the Act and it should be the responsibility of this court to enforce it. Griffin. In order…
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Partlow v. State, 813 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ement, courts have held that a defendant need not be informed of these designations before entering a plea, because they are collateral, rather than direct, consequences resulting from his convictions of certain sexual offenses. See Nelson v. State, 780 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Donovan v. State, 773 So. 2d [*1002] 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Pearman v. State, 764 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In State v. Stapleton, 764 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to w…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Lopez v. State, 536 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1988)
- Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Allen v. State, 642 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- LaMONICA v. State, 732 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Bertram OCE v. State, 742 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Fagundo v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Burkett v. State, 731 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Donovan v. State, 773 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Sigifredo Benitez v. State, 667 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)