ROBERTA A. BOGIN, WIFE, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JOHN A. BOGIN, HUSBAND, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The court held that the trial court erred in valuing the contents of the marital home and directed reconsideration of this and other asset valuations. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment.
The parties appealed an amended final judgment of dissolution, challenging the equitable distribution scheme. The trial court made certain valuations …
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PER CURIAM.
On this appeal and cross-appeal from an amended final judgment of dissolution, the parties assail the equitable distribution scheme on multiple grounds. We are constrained to agree that the trial court’s valuation of the contents of the marital home was error. On remand, this issue should be revisited, and the trial court should also determine the value of all three of the couple’s Atlantic Coast Federal Credit Union accounts and of both of the couple’s vehicles and any related liabilities, as of the date Ms. Bogin filed her petition for dissolution, August 7, 1998. See § 61.075(6), Fla.Stat. (1997). We find no error in the court’s order with respect to the remaining assets.
While the trial court was authorized to order the husband to establish and maintain a life insurance policy as security for support obligations, see § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. (1997), the wife concedes that further findings with respect to this issue are called for by the statute. We direct that the court make' findings on remand as to the availability and cost of such a policy and “consider the financial impact of any such order upon the obligated spouse,” keeping in mind that “any requirement to pay premiums should be taken into account in the determination of the amount of alimony.” Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1154 n. 2 (Fla.1989).
The trial court is authorized to revisit the amount of any payment necessary to equalize or otherwise render equitable the distribution of the parties’ assets, and may also reconsider the amount of alimony in light of any changes in equitable distribu tion. We otherwise affirm the amended final judgment of dissolution.
BENTON, PADOVANO, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
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Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…findings as to the availability and cost of the policies and the impact of such cost on the husband. See, e.g., Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Moreover, because “the surrender value of any existing life insurance policy would be an asset for purposes of equitable distribution and any requirement to pay premiums should be taken into account in the determination of the a…
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Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…g the necessity for such coverage.” Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). In doing so, the trial court must consider the cost and availability of the insurance and the financial impact on the obligor. See id.; Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971, 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Scalabroni v. Scalabroni, 807 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The trial court did not make any of these required findings in its order. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for proper findings, if possibl…
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Nelson v. Nelson, 795 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…nd, the court should also take the requirement to pay insurance premiums on the policy into account in the determination of alimony and the overall ability of Jesse to pay the obligations resulting from this dissolution judgment. See Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Wrinkle v. Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Sobelman. IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES. Betty argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in not ordering Jesse to pay all of her attorney’s fees. In the final judgment, the…
Authorities Cited
- Goldie Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989)