CHARLES NORMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DEBORAH NORMAN, APPELLEE
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Charles Norman appealed a final dissolution order contending errors in alimony, equitable distribution, life insurance requirements, child support expense apportionment, and attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed the alimony and equitable distribution determinations but reversed and remanded on the life insurance, medical expense apportionment, and attorney's fees issues due to lack of requisite findings and failure to account for the husband's alimony obligation.
The court affirmed the alimony and equitable distribution determinations. The court reversed the life insurance requirement, finding the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings regarding availability, cost, and impact on the husband. The court reversed the medical expense apportionment, finding the trial court failed to reduce the husband's percentage share after reducing his child support obligation. The court reversed the attorney's fees award due to insufficient findings regarding the fee calculation.
[1] A court must make specific findings regarding the availability, cost, and impact on the payor before ordering life insurance as security for alimony and child support.
[2] A trial court must consider the surrender value of existing life insurance policies and premium costs when determining alimony and equitable distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering the former husband to obtain two $125,000 life-insurance policies naming his former wife, appellee Deborah Norman, and his daughter as beneficiaries, without making specific findings as to the availability and cost of the policies and the impact of such cost on the husband.”
Establishes the requirement for specific findings before ordering life insurance as security for alimony and child support.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles and Deborah Norman divorced. The trial court ordered Charles to obtain two $125,000 life insurance policies naming Deborah and their daughter …
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PER CURIAM.
Charles Norman appeals a final order of dissolution, contending that the lower court erred in its determinations of (I) alimony, (II) equitable distribution, (III) life insurance as security for alimony and child support, (IV) apportionment of the minor child’s nonmedical expenses, and (V) attorney’s fees. We affirm Issues I and II, and reverse and remand as to Issues III, IV, and V.
The trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering the former husband to obtain two $125,000 life-insurance policies naming his former wife, appellee Deborah Norman, and his daughter as beneficiaries, without making specific findings as to the availability and cost of the policies and the impact of such cost on the husband. See, e.g., Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Moreover, because “the surrender value of any existing life insurance policy would be an asset for purposes of equitable distribution and any requirement to pay premiums should be taken into account in the determination of the amount of alimony,” we direct the court to revisit these two awards on remand. Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1154 n. 2 (Fla.1989). We otherwise reject appellant’s arguments in Issues I and II.
The trial court also erred by ordering the former husband to pay 79 percent of the child’s noncovered medical, dental, optometric, psychological, psychiatric, and orthodontia expenses. On motion for rehearing below, the trial court acknowledged that it had failed to include the former husband’s alimony obligation to the former wife when it calculated their respective incomes for the purpose of determining their proportionate shares of child support. Although the court thereupon reduced the former husband’s child-support obligation, it failed to make a corresponding reduction in his percentage share of the child’s noncovered medical and dental expenses. On remand, the court shall reapportion the parties’ obligation to pay these expenses.
The husband fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in determining the wife’s entitlement to attorney’s fees. Courts have found no abuse of discretion in awarding fees to a wife when the trial court has awarded the principal income-producing asset to the husband and the wife’s principal income is alimony. See McAvoy v. McAvoy, 662 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Reich v. Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
The trial court did err, however, by failing to make the requisite findings as to the amount of fees. See Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985);1 Ard v. Ard, 765 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). A dissolution order directing a party to pay the other party’s fees and costs, which recites simply that the total amounts “are reasonable time spent and hourly rates,” is insufficient under Rowe. See Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). “The lack of findings constitutes reversible error, even if there is competent, substantial evidence to support the award.” Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for further consistent proceedings.
ERVIN, WEBSTER, and HAWKES, JJ., concur. . We reject appellee's claim that the former husband waived this issue once the parties agreed to forego closing arguments. The omission of findings was not apparent until the court issued the final order. Moreover, the burden of proof is on the party seeking attorney's fees, and the opposing party does not waive the issue by not submitting evidence contradicting the movant. See S. Pointe Family & Children Ctr., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 783 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Winder v. Dian A. Winder, 152 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…ay the other party’s fees and costs, which recites simply that the total amounts ‘are reasonable time spent and hourly rates,’ is insufficient under [Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla.1985) ].” Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)). We reverse the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [*843] REVERSED…
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Duke v. Duke, 211 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…s that “recites simply that the total amounts ‘are reasonable time spent and hourly rates,’ is insufficient under [Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985)].” Winder, 152 So. 3d at 842 (quoting Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). Here, the trial court awarded $9,312.75 in attorney’s fees to Former Wife. It found that Former Wife demonstrated a need for attorney’s fees and that Former Husband had the ability to contribute to them. It provided in th…
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Galstyan v. Galstyan, 85 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…y and child support obligations. Further, if a trial court orders a spouse to obtain life insurance, then it must make “specific findings as to the availability and cost of the policies and the impact of such cost on the husband.” Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Davidson v. Davidson, 882 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (reversing and remanding the portion of a final judgment ordering the spouse to obtain life insurance because the trial court [*566] failed to make factual findi…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Goldie Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989)
- Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- ARD v. ARD, 765 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- McAVOY v. McAVOY, 662 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Reich v. Bette Ann Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)