RASHAN JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rashan Jones appeals from summary denial of his post-conviction motion for resentencing under Heggs v. State, which struck down the 1995 sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional. The court partially affirms and reverses, requiring the trial court to determine whether Jones's plea agreement was conditioned on a specific guideline range before denying relief.
If Jones's plea was conditioned on receiving a sentence calculated with reference to the guidelines and his sentence exceeds the 1994 guidelines range, he is entitled to relief under Heggs, with the state having the option of proceeding to trial or resentencing under the 1994 guidelines. The summary denial was improper because the trial court failed to attach record materials addressing whether the plea was conditioned on a specific guideline range. Even if Jones is not entitled to Heggs relief, the denial must be without prejudice to challenging the voluntariness of his plea based on the unconstitutional 1995 guidelines.
[1] A defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief under Heggs v. …
[2] If a negotiated plea agreement is not conditioned upon the imposition of a sentence within a specific guideline range, improper scoring of a scoresheet does not render th…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If appellant entered a negotiated plea agreement which was not conditioned upon the imposition of a sentence within a specific guideline range, improper scoring of appellant's scoresheet would not render his plea illegal unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.”
Establishes the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned plea agreements in the context of guideline sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was sentenced to a term of years pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court denied his post-conviction motion for resentencing under Heggs v.…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Rashan Jones, appeals from an order summarily denying his motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.850, entered after this court reversed a prior denial of the same motion in an opinion issued on July 19, 2000. See Jones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We agree that the charging document attached to the second order of denial conclusively refuted appellant’s first ground for relief and as to that ground, we affirm without further discussion.
Appellant’s second ground for relief sought resentencing under Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000) (sustaining a constitutional challenge based on the single subject rule to the 1995 sentencing guidelines, enacted by Chapter 95-184). Appellant alleged in his motion that he was sentenced to the bottom of the guidelines in accordance with his plea agreement. In the order now on appeal, the trial court denied this ground for relief, based on the fact that appellant was sentenced to a term of years pursuant to his legitimate, un-coerced plea bargain, which would still have been permissible under the 1994 guidelines.
However, no portions of the record were attached in support of this portion of the order to refute appellant’s allegations that his plea was for a bottom of the guidelines sentence.
If appellant entered a negotiated plea agreement which was not conditioned upon the imposition of a sentence within a specific guideline range, improper scoring of appellant’s seoresheet would not render his plea illegal unless the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. See Dunenas v. Moore, 762 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
However, if his plea were conditioned on receiving a sentence calculated with reference to the guidelines, and his sentence exceeds the 1994 guidelines range, then he would be entitled to relief under Heggs. The state would then have the option of proceeding to trial on the original charges or having appellant resen-tenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines. See Vareia v. State, 777 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Buckingham v. State, 771 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Bonilla v. State, 766 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing motion to correct illegal sentence for determination of whether plea agreement was conditioned on sentencing guidelines, as neither copy of written plea agreement nor transcript of plea colloquy was attached to order of denial).
See also Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that an allegation that plea was pursuant to negotiated agreement to receive mid-guidelines sentence as habitual offender should be raised in rule 3.850 motion and opining that movant should have two years from issuance of Heggs in which to file).
Furthermore, even if appellant is not entitled to relief under Heggs, the denial of the instant motion should be without prejudice to appellant’s seeking to withdraw his plea as involuntarily entered based on the unconstitutional 1995 guidelines. See Mortimer v. State, 770 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (affirming summary denial of motion to correct sentence because it was not an illegal sentence, as it was within the 1994 sentencing guidelines range and was imposed pursuant to a plea agreement which did not clearly demonstrate that the parties and judge intended the sentence to be the lowest permissible guidelines sentence, but without prejudice to the defendant’s challenging the voluntary and intelligent character of his plea by post-conviction proceedings); Murphy v. State, 773 So. 2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KLEIN, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gregory Banks v. State, 887 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2004)…that defendants should have two years from the issuance of the supreme court’s opinion in Heggs in which to raise it [*1196] in a rule 3.850 motion, as the facts on which the claim is predicated could not have been known earlier.” In Jones v. State, 781 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), Jones alleged in his rule 3.850 motion that he entered a plea to be sentenced at the bottom of the 1995 guidelines. Jones, 781 So. 2d at 448. The trial court denied relief finding that Jones was sentenced to a term of years. Id.…1 / 2
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Hipps v. State, 790 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…, and the sentence was within the statutory maximum). This affirmance is without prejudice to appellant’s right to seek relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 under the theory that his plea was involuntary. See Jones v. State, 781 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In so saying, we distinguish Booker v. State, 771 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review granted, SC00-2693, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. June 15, 2001), because appellant, who was sentenced within the October 1, 1995 through May 24,…
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Bell v. State, 795 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…CA 2000). However, if a plea agreement is conditioned upon receiving a sentence calculated with reference to the guidelines, and the sentence exceeds the 1994 guideline range, then the defendant is entitled to relief under Heggs. See Jones v. State, 781 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In this case, the appellant’s plea agreement states that “on the lesser charge of second-degree murder, I will be adjudicated guilty. There will be a sentencing hearing. My sentence will be within my guidelines which are 20.5 y…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Pagliaro v. Penske Auto Ctrs., Inc., 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Durwin D. Dunenas v. Moore, 762 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Mortimer v. State, 770 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Jenkins v. State, 771 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Buckingham v. State, 771 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Bonilla v. State, 766 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Vareia v. State, 777 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)