ROBERT STURGIS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2001-02-15
No. SC96210
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ, concur., QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
781 So. 2d 1069 Florida Supreme Court (2001)

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Synopsis

Robert Sturgis challenged his fifteen-year sentence under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act on multiple constitutional grounds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, finding that all of Sturgis's challenges had been previously addressed and rejected in prior decisions.


Holding

The Court affirmed Sturgis's sentence, holding that all of his constitutional challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act had been previously resolved in other cases and were without merit.


Headnotes

[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the ex post facto clause.

[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation.

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Key Quotes

“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”

Establishes that the Court's role is to determine whether prior precedent resolves all of Sturgis's challenges.

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Facts & Procedural History

Sturgis was sentenced to fifteen years under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. He challenged this sentence on several grounds, including claims that…

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Opinion of the Court
LEWIS, J.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review Sturgis v. State, 733 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Sturgis challenges his fifteen-year sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by other opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act violates neither separation of powers nor principles of due process by allowing a “victim veto” that precludes application of the Act, as well as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment);2 Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991)). Accordingly, we approve the decision in Sturgis.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ, concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

. See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).

. The district court, in affirming Sturgis’ sentence, cited to its decision in Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, 779 So. 2d 265 (Fla.2001). In our decision in Cotton, we disapproved the opinion in Speed to the extent that it implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives to each victim a veto over the imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of the Act.

Dissent
QUINCE, J.,

QUINCE, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 346, 368-59 (Fla.2000).


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