JOHNNY SANTIAGO, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)
  …nstrued as an ongoing waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode, including any newly filed charges arising out of the incident. See Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986); Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Morris v. State, 715 So. 2d 1177, 1178-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Here, the parties concede that the post-expiration continuance in the juvenile proceeding is the dispositive issue in reviewing the viability of the adult char…
• Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012)
  …pondent “must have an opportunity to withdraw his waiver and renew the requirement that a trial be held within thirty days.” Id. (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(b) (permitting a criminal defendant to demand a trial within sixty days); Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Once a waiver of speedy trial rights has occurred, a defendant may ‘start the clock running again’ by invoking a demand for speedy trial.”)).12 Two years after the Second District decided Curry, the Legislature imposed a…
• State v. Burgess, 153 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
  …e of expiration waives a defendant’s speedy trial rights under the default period of the rule”). Once waived, the defendant can “start the clock running again,” but only by invoking a demand for speedy trial under rule 3.191(b). See Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Interpretation of rule 3.191 is a legal question subject to de novo review. See Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 573-74. Here, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that Burgess had not waived his right to a spe…

Authorities Cited

• Blackiston v. State, 772 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)