GENE ATKINS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a prior defense continuance constituted a waiver of speedy trial rights, which carried over to a superseding information.
Petitioner was charged with solicitation, and later a superseding information added more serious charges arising from the same incident. Petitioner's …
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PER CURIAM.
Gene Atkins seeks a writ of prohibition, barring the trial court from proceeding further in a felony prosecution because of his allegation the speedy trial period prescribed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) has expired. Atkins was originally charged in case number 98-10089 CF10A with solicitation to commit aggravated battery, following his arrest on May 15, 1998. This information was superseded by a re-filed information, case number 99-19830 CF10A, filed on November 2, 1999, charging the same solicitation, as well as attempted murder, arson, and possession of a firebomb. The new charges arose from the same incident which formed the basis for the 1998 solicitation charge.
In 2000, Atkins’ attorney filed a motion to dismiss raising the speedy trial claim, the denial of which led to this petition. We deny the petition. Because Atkins moved for a defense continuance on November 5, 1998, during the pendency of the earlier-filed information, that continuance constituted a waiver of his speedy trial rights. See Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1986). Further, any express waiver of speedy trial, whether by defense motion to continue or otherwise, stands as an ongoing waiver as to any newly filed information arising out of the same incident. Morris v. State, 715 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). This is true whether the new charges are less serious or more serious than the previously filed charges. Compare Stewart with Moms.
Once a waiver of speedy trial rights has occurred, a defendant may “start the clock running again” by invoking a demand for speedy trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b). That was not done here, and Atkins was therefore not entitled to a dismissal, as the speedy trial requirement had been waived.
PETITION DENIED.
POLEN, FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)…nstrued as an ongoing waiver of speedy trial rights as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode, including any newly filed charges arising out of the incident. See Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986); Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Morris v. State, 715 So. 2d 1177, 1178-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Here, the parties concede that the post-expiration continuance in the juvenile proceeding is the dispositive issue in reviewing the viability of the adult char…
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Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2012)…pondent “must have an opportunity to withdraw his waiver and renew the requirement that a trial be held within thirty days.” Id. (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(b) (permitting a criminal defendant to demand a trial within sixty days); Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Once a waiver of speedy trial rights has occurred, a defendant may ‘start the clock running again’ by invoking a demand for speedy trial.”)).12 Two years after the Second District decided Curry, the Legislature imposed a…
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State v. Burgess, 153 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…e of expiration waives a defendant’s speedy trial rights under the default period of the rule”). Once waived, the defendant can “start the clock running again,” but only by invoking a demand for speedy trial under rule 3.191(b). See Atkins v. State, 785 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Interpretation of rule 3.191 is a legal question subject to de novo review. See Nelson, 26 So. 3d at 573-74. Here, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that Burgess had not waived his right to a spe…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986)
- Willis v. State, 715 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)