NESTOR F. MANRIQUE, APPELLANT,
v.
LUZ MANRIQUE, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the husband's interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony, despite it being the parties' only substantial asset. The court held that while such an award might be disfavored, the trial court did not abuse its discretion given the wife's limited earning capacity, the children's need for stability, and the husband's unexplained ability to accumulate wealth beyond his modest income.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony. Although such awards are disfavored and the court might not have made the same determination initially, the circumstances here—including the wife's limited earning capacity, the children's need for residential stability, the family's comfortable lifestyle during marriage, and the husband's unexplained wealth accumulation—justified the award.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding the husband's interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony when the wife has limited earning abili…
[2] A trial court's award of the marital home as lump sum alimony is distinguishable from cases reversing such awards when the parties are not in roughly equal financial situ…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although we might not have made such an award if we were making the initial determination... we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion on this record.”
Establishes the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review for alimony awards
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for ten years. The wife spoke little English, did not work outside the home during the marriage, and had limited earning abil…
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PER CURIAM.
The major issue in this appeal is the award of the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony, even though it was the only substantial asset of the parties. Although we might not have made such an award if we were making the initial determination, see Bible v. Bible, 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1983), we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion on this record. See Lopez v. Lopez, 438 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Minniti v. Minniti, 445 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
The wife in this ease speaks little English. For ten years of the marriage she did not work outside of the home. Her earning ability is limited. The court imputed her net income at $825.92 per month. The couple’s two minor children have always lived in the home; the court found that their removal from “the only home they have ever known” would cause them great “stress.” The parties enjoyed an “extremely comfortable lifestyle” during the marriage.
Finally, despite a modest income that never exceeded $30,000 per year, the husband fully paid for a $175,000 house in less than fifteen years and had recently purchased a Mazda Mille-nia with a $15,000 down payment.
The court rejected the husband’s claim that after the death of his father, he received $50,000 from the sale of land in Columbia as an inheritance.
The trial court was influenced by the husband’s unexplained ability to fund a lifestyle beyond his modest income with “extremely large sums of cash.” * This case is distinguishable from cases reversing awards of marital homes as lump sum alimony. Unlike Suarez v. Suarez, 514 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), the parties are not in “roughly equal financial situations.” Nor does the award in this case “force the husband from his modest economic status to a state of relative impoverishment.” Satanonchai v. Satanonchai 522 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
The husband did not own the home prior to the marriage and the wife requested the relief she received. Cf. Klinger v. Klinger, 570 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reversing award of home as lump sum alimony where wife did not request such relief, husband owned home prior to marriage, $205,000 equity in home was sole asset of marriage aside from “meager” pension plan, and wife had sold her premarital home and used proceeds for “purposes unrelated to marriage”).
Affirmed.
STONE, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Horacio A. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 958 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…afferstone v. Safferstone, 501 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(same), with Bressler v. Bressler, 914 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(upholding award of marital home), Russell v. Russell, 890 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(same), Manrique v. Manrique, 786 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(same), and Soll v. Soll, 560 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(same). . The court may take additional evidence, and may make additional or different awards, including equitable distribution, if appropriate.…
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Coyle v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 785 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ights rendered ineffective because the trial judge never told him about them. We have countenanced far longer times in failing to seek relief that is functionally indistinguishable from that sought by petitioner in this case. See Patterson v. State, 786 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (6 years delay in filing for relief from failure of trial judge to advise of right of appeal from order denying post conviction relief not unreasonably prejudicial to state). In deciding the legal standard of reasonable diligence…
Authorities Cited
- Kuvin v. Kuvin, 442 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1983)
- Pundik v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Lopez v. Addys Lopez, 438 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Editorial Cernuda, Inc. v. Editorial Am., S.A., 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Blue Satanonchai v. Amparo Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Harris v. State, 514 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Klinger v. Klinger, 570 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Minniti v. Minniti, 445 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- M.L. v. State, 445 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)