MELISSA LYNN ARMSTRONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Armstrong appealed the summary denial of her motion to correct her sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), raising issues about how sentences in two related cases should have been calculated under sentencing guidelines. The court reversed and remanded, holding that separate scoresheets were required for offenses committed under different versions of the sentencing guidelines.
The court reversed, holding that separate scoresheets are required for offenses committed when different versions of the sentencing guidelines are applicable. The 1997 offenses should be calculated on a separate scoresheet and may be properly added to the scoresheet for older offenses as prior offenses rather than additional offenses. The later offenses should not have been included on the scoresheet when resentencing Armstrong in the 1996 case because they were not prior offenses.
[1] Separate scoresheets are required for offenses committed when different versions of the sentencing guidelines are applicable.
[2] Offenses that occurred prior to the sentencing window period for a subsequent conviction may be added to the subsequent scoresheet as prior offenses, not additional offen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Separate scoresheets are required for offenses committed when different versions of the sentencing guidelines are applicable.”
Establishes the core legal principle that different guideline versions require separate scoresheets
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArmstrong was originally sentenced for multiple offenses across two cases (CF97-00506B-XX and CF96-00441A-XX) on one scoresheet. She filed a motion to…
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[*75] PER CURIAM.
Melissa Lynn Armstrong appeals the summary denial of her motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) to correct her sentence in case number CF97-00506B-XX. She has also appealed her amended judgment and sentence entered on a separate conviction in case number CF96-00441A-XX. Because these appeals are interrelated, we consolidate case numbers 2D00-3639 and 2D00-5041, reverse the order of the trial court in case number 2D00-3639, and vacate the amended sentence in case number 2D00-5041.
When Armstrong was originally sentenced in these cases, she was sentenced for multiple offenses on one score-sheet. In her motion to correct her sentence, Armstrong sought relief for her convictions in case numbers CF97-00506B-XX and CF96-00441A-XX in reliance on Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). The trial court found that the offenses encompassed in the 1997 case fell outside of the Heggs window period and denied relief. The trial court granted relief as to the 1996 case and subsequently resentenced Armstrong in that case.
Although the court was correct in denying Heggs relief in the 1997 case, the court should nonetheless have resen-tenced Armstrong in that case based on a new seoresheet. Separate scoresheets are required for offenses committed when different versions of the sentencing guidelines are applicable. § 921.0014(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The new seoresheet for the post-Heggs 1997 offenses should not include the offenses that fell within the Heggs window period as additional offenses because those offenses occurred pri-or to the 1997 offenses. Consequently, the sentence for the older offenses should be calculated on a separate seoresheet and may properly be added to the subsequent seoresheet as prior, rather than as additional, offenses.
Similarly, the trial court should not have included these later offenses on Armstrong’s seoresheet when it resentenced her in the 1996 case because they were not prior offenses. Accordingly, Armstrong must be resentenced on all of her convictions pursuant to the guidelines applicable to each conviction. See State v. White, 762 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Reversed and remanded.
BLUE, A.C.J., and GREEN and STRINGER, JJ., concur.
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Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…d points on the 1994 scoresheet for a felony battery in circuit court case 98-526. Because it was not committed within the Heggs window, the felony battery in case 98-526 should have been scored on a separate 1995 scoresheet. See Armstrong v. State, 787 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thus, it appears that Casey’s 91-month prison sentence constituted a departure under the 1994 guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief under rule 3.800. Casey may seek Heggs resentencing by filing a motion under r…
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Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cresandra White, 762 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)