BRADLEY CASEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bradley Casey appeals the denial of his postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), seeking resentencing under Heggs v. State. The court affirms the denial but holds that Casey may pursue Heggs relief through a rule 3.850 motion instead, as rule 3.800 cannot adequately address claims where the State made concessions in a negotiated plea.
While Casey may be entitled to Heggs relief, he is not entitled to automatic resentencing under rule 3.800 because his sentence resulted from a negotiated plea where the State gave up something. He must seek relief under rule 3.850, which allows for an evidentiary hearing and protects the State's right to withdraw from the plea if it chooses. A rule 3.850 motion is timely if filed within two years from the Heggs decision date.
[1] A defendant seeking resentencing under Heggs v. …
[2] When a defendant seeks Heggs resentencing following a negotiated plea where the State made concessions, the State may elect to either agree to a sentence under the applic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the original sentence is the product of a negotiated plea where the State gave up something, a defendant is not entitled to automatic resentencing under Heggs, even if the sentence constituted a departure under the 1994 guidelines.”
Establishes the primary holding that Heggs relief is not automatic when the sentence resulted from a negotiated plea with State concessions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCasey received a suspended 91-month sentence and was placed on probation for 8 years in 1996. After violating probation, he was sentenced to 91 months…
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PER CURIAM.
Bradley Casey appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He argues that he is entitled to resentencing under Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). While we agree that Casey may be entitled to Heggs relief, we hold that he must seek this relief by way of a rule 3.850 motion. Accordingly, we affirm.
In circuit court case 96-3438, Casey received a suspended prison sentence of 91 months and was placed on probation for 8 years. After violating his probation, Casey was sentenced to 91 months in prison. The 1995 guidelines range was 54.7 to 91.2 months in prison. Therefore, his original placement on probation was a downward departure, to which the State agreed in the negotiated plea. By agreeing to probation, the State gave up something, to wit: a sentence under the guidelines.
When the original sentence is the product of a negotiated plea where the State gave up something, a defendant is not entitled to automatic resentencing under Heggs, even if the sentence constituted a departure under the 1994 guidelines. Latiif v. State, 787 So. 2d 834 (Fla.2001). Instead, when a defendant seeks Heggs resentencing after a negotiated plea where the State gave up something, the State has the option of either agreeing to a sentence under the 1994 guidelines or withdrawing from the plea and taking the defendant to trial. Id. See also Sidell v. State, 787 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Because a plea withdrawal is a potential consequence in such cases and because an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine whether the State gave up something in negotiating the plea, this type of claim cannot be adjudicated under rule 3.800. The defendant in such cases should seek relief under rule 3.850. By invoking this rule, the defendant must understand that the plea agreement could be set aside. The State may have foregone habitual offender sanctions; it may have agreed to lesser charges; or it may have nolle prossed some of the charges. Depending on the State’s concessions in the original plea agreement, a defendant may face increased incarceration as a result of seeking Heggs relief if the State decides to withdraw from the plea and thereafter obtains convictions on the original charges.
In this case, the trial court denied relief by finding that Casey’s sentence did not constitute a departure under the 1994 guidelines. This finding is erroneous, however, because the State incorrectly scored points on the 1994 scoresheet for a felony battery in circuit court case 98-526. Because it was not committed within the Heggs window, the felony battery in case 98-526 should have been scored on a separate 1995 scoresheet. See Armstrong v. State, 787 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thus, it appears that Casey’s 91-month prison sentence constituted a departure under the 1994 guidelines.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief under rule 3.800. Casey may seek Heggs resentencing by filing a motion under rule 3.850. Such motion shall be timely if filed within two years from the date of the Heggs decision. See Murphy v. State, 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (en banc).
BLUE, C.J., and PATTERSON and FULMER, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Romero v. State, 805 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…o induce Mr. Romero to plead, then the State has the option of allowing Mr. Romero to be resen-tenced under a corrected scoresheet1 or it may withdraw from the pleas and proceed to trial on the original charges. As this court said in Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), “Because a plea withdrawal is a potential consequence in such cases and because an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine whether the State gave up something in negotiating the plea, this type of claim cannot be…
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Valentine Rodriguez v. State, 883 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…eversal of these sentences may vitiate the State’s intent in the agreement. Thus on remand, the State can either consent to an alternate sentencing scheme for these crimes or withdraw from the plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Wallen v. State, 877 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Reversed and remanded. FULMER and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . See § 784.021, Fla. Stat. (2001). . See § 784.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). . Although these cases hold that enhance…
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State v. Anderson, 821 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…notice of appeal of a sentence or (2) while an appeal is pending. However, the relief sought by the defendant here, relief from his 1982 plea, was not available under Rule 3.800 but rather was only appropriate under Rule 3.850. See Casey v. State, 788 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(where plea withdrawal is potential consequence of relief sought and evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine whether plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, claim must be bought by way of Rule 3.850 and not Rule 3…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Pagliaro v. Penske Auto Ctrs., Inc., 773 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Salim Kamau Latiif v. State, 787 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2001)
- Sidell v. State, 787 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Armstrong v. State, 787 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)