LARRY ROGER BARNETT, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN M. BARNETT, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2001-06-08
No. 2D00-2420
PATTERSON, C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur.
787 So. 2d 946 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Larry Barnett appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a 1996 Florida divorce judgment. The appellate court reversed because the Florida trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the dissolution judgment, as a Tennessee divorce decree involving the same parties had already been entered in December 1995.


Holding

The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the 1996 Florida dissolution judgment because the prior Tennessee judgment had already dissolved the marriage and divided the marital property. Accordingly, the Florida judgment was void and could be set aside at any time. The court reversed the order denying the motion to set aside the dissolution judgment and remanded with directions to vacate it.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage if a valid dissolution judgment has already been entered by another court of competent jurisdiction…

[2] A prior valid judgment of dissolution from another state must be given full faith and credit by Florida courts.

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Key Quotes

“In November 1996, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment of marital dissolution in this case, because a Tennessee judgment entered in December 1995 had since dissolved the marriage of the parties herein and had already equitably divided their marital property.”

Establishes the core holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the marriage had already been dissolved by an earlier Tennessee judgment.

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Facts & Procedural History

Larry and Susan Barnett were divorced by a Tennessee court in December 1995. Subsequently, in November 1996, a Florida trial court entered a final jud…

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Opinion of the Court
THREADGILL, Judge.

THREADGILL, Judge.

The appellant, Larry Roger Barnett, the former husband herein, challenges a final order denying his Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion to set aside a Florida final judgment of marital dissolution entered in November 1996. He contends the foregoing judgment should have been set aside as void, in light of a Tennessee final judgment of marital dissolution — involving these same parties in this same marriage — previously entered in 1995. We agree and reverse on that point only. We, however, affirm without discussion the order denying the appellant’s motion to set aside the November 1996 dissolution judgment on the basis of the former wife’s purported fraud, as there is no merit to that claim.

In November 1996, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment of marital dissolution in this case, because a Tennessee judgment entered in December 1995 had since dissolved the marriage of the parties herein and had already equitably divided their marital property. See Groover v. Groover, 383 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (holding that where there is no valid marriage, a trial court in a purported dissolution proceeding cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, instead of entering a dissolution judgment, the trial court at that time should have given full faith and credit to the Tennessee judgment. Bowers v. Bowers, 326 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1976); Dusesoi v. Dusesoi, 498 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also Atwell v. Atwell, 730 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). For that reason, the trial court in this more recent instance erred in failing to grant the former husband’s motion to set aside the 1996 Florida dissolution judgment as void and in failing to enter an appropriate order vacating the same, because a void judgment can be attacked and vacated at any time. Dep’t of Revenue v. Thurmond, 721 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Outler v. Berman, 234 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970).

Accordingly, this cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to enter an appropriate order vacating the 1996 Florida judgment of marital dissolution as void. Orders relating to the custodial responsibility of the parties’ minor children are otherwise affirmed. Barnett v. Barnett, 718 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (where, in the former wife’s earlier appeal in this same cause, this court ultimately remanded for consideration of child custody, support, and visitation issues, otherwise leaving the door open to the former husband to attempt to set aside the dissolution judgment on appropriate grounds); Barnett v. Barnett, No. 01A01-9605-CH-00228, 1998 WL 787043 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.13, 1998) (wherein the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Tennessee final judgment of dissolution in this same cause, vacating it only to the extent that it decided child custody issues, based upon the conclusion that “[bjecause the Florida court was the first to exercise its custody jurisdiction, the trial court erred by addressing the custody issues rather than deferring to the Florida court”).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

PATTERSON, C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Weiss v. Weiss, 973 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Florida courts recognize this requirement. See Stewart v. Stewart, 115 Fla. 158, 155 So. 114, 115 (1934); Barnett v. Barnett, 787 So. 2d 946, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In order to trigger the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the judgment must be valid and final and consistent with statutory and case law in the state where rendered. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 26, 30 S.Ct. 682, 54 L.Ed. 90…
  • Jacques Junior Armand v. Ginou Armand Amisy, 316 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
    …cy of the State of Florida.” Id. at 229. Where a foreign judgment has previously dissolved the marriage of the parties, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment of marital dissolution. See Barnett v. Barnett, 787 So. 2d 946, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). On the record before us, it remains undetermined whether the Haitian divorce decree was a valid judgment entitled to comity by the Florida court. Armand had filed the foreign decree, asserted a facially sufficient challen…
  • Barnett v. Barnett, 802 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …ive child support. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. The parties’ long and contentious dissolution proceedings, both here and in Tennessee where the husband lives with the parties’ three children, began in 1995. See Barnett v. Barnett, 787 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Barnett v. Barnett, 727 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Barnett v. Barnett, 718 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Barnett v. Barnett, No. 01A01-9605-CH-00228, 1998 WL 787043 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 13, 1998). The only issue before us now…

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