JOHN P. BOWERS, PETITIONER,
v.
AURORA B. BOWERS, RESPONDENT
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A Florida wife sought to dissolve her marriage in Florida state court, but the husband challenged Florida's jurisdiction based on residency requirements. While the case was pending on appeal, the parties obtained a final divorce decree in Virginia, which the Florida Supreme Court held is entitled to full faith and credit, thereby mooting the Florida proceedings.
The Virginia divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit under the U.S. Constitution, and therefore the Florida proceedings are moot and the petition for certiorari is dismissed as moot.
[1] A party's intent is a necessary element in establishing residency for the purpose of divorce proceedings, even if they have physically resided in a state for a significan…
[2] A foreign divorce decree, if valid and final, is entitled to full faith and credit in other states, thereby mooting any pending divorce actions in those states.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the final Virginia decree is entitled to full faith and credit, pursuant to United States Constitution, art. 4, § 1”
Establishes the constitutional basis for recognizing the Virginia divorce decree in Florida
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohn P. Bowers, a Naval officer, married Aurora B. Bowers in Massachusetts in 1969. When stationed in Florida (first in Key West, then Mayport), the c…
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HATCHETT, Justice.
On April 2, 1973, Aurora B. Bowers filed in circuit court for dissolution of the marriage she had contracted in Massachusetts with John P. Bowers on November 22, 1969. No. 73-2902 CA (4th Cir.). The wife’s petition for dissolution was met with a motion to dismiss. At the time of the marriage, petitioner, who was and still is a Naval officer, was stationed at Key West. The first home the couple established was in Key West, and their second home was also in Florida, at Mayport. The husband testified, however, that he never intended to make Florida his residence, and considered Norfolk, Virginia, his permanent residence. The circuit court concluded that the husband had never established residence in Florida, notwithstanding the length of his stay, because he lacked the requisite intent.
In support of the motion to dismiss, the husband argued that his wife was presumed to have the same (Virginia) residence as himself and, therefore, could not meet the residency requirement laid down by Fla.Stat. § 61.021 (1973). The circuit, court granted the motion to dismiss, but, on appeal by the wife, the order of dismis sal was reversed by the District Court of Appeal, First District. 287 So. 2d 722. After that court denied petition for rehearing, the husband petitioned here for writ of certiorari, which was granted on August 28, 1974, Mr. Justice Roberts dissenting.
In papers filed in this Court, -the parties’ counsel represent that the husband initiated divorce proceedings in Virginia during the pendency of the appeal in the First District; that the wife made a general appearance in Virginia; and that a final divorce decree was issued by a Virginia court on March 27, 1974, in accordance with a stipulation entered into by the parties. The record reflects no stay of the Florida order of dismissal, and at no time has either party questioned the jurisdiction of the Virginia court. In these circumstances, the final Virginia decree is entitled to full faith and credit, pursuant to United States Constitution, art. 4, § 1, Kline v. Hayman, 309 So. 2d 242 (Fla.App. 2d Dist.1975); Stewart v. Stewart, 115 Fla. 158, 155 So. 114 (1934); Annot. 58 A.L.R.2d 701 (1958), and the effect of the Virginia decree is to moot the present cause. Newton v. Newton, 245 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1971) (“A divorce decree of any state is presumed valid on its face and until same is proved to be invalid serves as a bar to successful prosecution of another action for divorce in this State.” At 46.)
The husband, petitioner here, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness in the District Court of Appeal; the wife opposed that motion but has filed here a motion to quash petition for certiorari on the basis of the Virginia decree. The First District properly denied the husband’s motion to dismiss for mootness because at that time no final foreign judgment had been entered. Since then, however, the Virginia court proceedings have eventuated in a final divorce decree, to which we are bound to give full faith and credit. Newton v. Newton, supra (“every state is required to recognize ... final decrees ... of the courts of all other states.” At 46). Accordingly, the writ of certiorari previously granted in this cause is discharged, and the petition is dismissed as moot.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Eckel v. Eckel, 522 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…pletely anachronistic’ to hold that a wife could not obtain a domicile or residency different than that of her husband until the actual physical separation of the parties.” Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert, discharged, 326 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1976). In Bowers, the wife’s physical presence in Florida for three years, coupled with her intent to remain, was sufficient for her to meet the test of residency for divorce purposes, despite statements by her serviceman/husband that he never…
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Celisseule Nicolas v. Nicolas, 444 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…plinger, 147 Fla. 243, 2 So. 2d 870 (1941); accord Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Curran v. Curran, 362 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. discharged, 326 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1976). A person may, however, be a legal resident of Florida within the meaning of the above statute without being an American citizen, as it is legal residence, not citizenship, which is made a statutory prerequisite for bringing a marriage d…
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Barnett v. Barnett, 787 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…urt in a purported dissolution proceeding cannot obtain subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, instead of entering a dissolution judgment, the trial court at that time should have given full faith and credit to the Tennessee judgment. Bowers v. Bowers, 326 So. 2d 172 (Fla.1976); Dusesoi v. Dusesoi, 498 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Walker v. Walker, 566 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also Atwell v. Atwell, 730 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). For that reason, the trial court in this more recent instance e…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Uhlan Stanley Newton v. Newton, 245 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1971)
- Aurora B. Bowers v. Bowers, 287 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Kline v. Heyman, 309 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Stewart v. Stewart, 115 Fla. 158 (Fla. 1934)