ARNOLD LUSTIG, APPELLANT,
v.
ALINA GARCIA, APPELLEE
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Lustig sued Garcia for equitable lien and restitution for unjust enrichment in a bench trial. The trial court dismissed the case sua sponte before Lustig completed his evidence presentation and based the dismissal on credibility assessments rather than whether a prima facie case was shown. The appellate court reversed, holding that involuntary dismissals cannot occur before a plaintiff completes evidence presentation and cannot be based on credibility determinations.
An involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed presentation of evidence. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff had rested, a trial judge ruling on an involuntary dismissal motion may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility; the inquiry must be limited to whether the claimant has submitted a prima facie case.
[1] An involuntary dismissal of a case tried without a jury may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of evidence.
[2] In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal, a trial judge may not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence.”
Establishes the primary holding that dismissal occurred prematurely under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLustig brought suit against Garcia seeking an equitable lien and restitution for unjust enrichment. During Lustig's case-in-chief at a non-jury trial,…
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STONE, J.
The final judgment is reversed.
Lustig brought suit against Garcia for imposition of an equitable lien and sought restitution for unjust enrichment. In the course of the non-jury trial, the court erred by involuntarily dismissing the case before the plaintiff (Lustig) had rested. The court also erred in basing the dismissal on a credibility assessment.
Lustig testified during his case-in-chief. During cross-examination, the defense established that Lustig earns his living gambling and that he pays no federal income or social security taxes on that income. After some additional impeachment, the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the complaint, stating:
He has got the burden of proof. We got Susan saying that she overheard a conversation in which he supposedly said if anything happens to me I want Alina to have the property.
We got the felon coming in saying, Ed Flaxman saying if anything happens to me I desire this house goes to my son. So we already have a conflict in their case.
I wouldn’t believe this guy if he was sitting on a stack of bibles.
The court then indicated that the defense had prevailed. At that point, Lustig’s attorney attempted to address the trial court but was interrupted by the court who essentially told the attorney to take it up with the appellate court. The trial court then terminated the proceedings. Lustig had not resumed re-direct examination or rested his case. Final judgment was entered in favor of Garcia.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b), provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Involuntary Dismissal.... After a party seeking affirmative relief in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of evidence, any other party may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief, without waiving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the party seeking affirmative relief or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence.
Applying this rule, we have held that an involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence. See SJS Enters. v. Cates, 547 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). See also Akdoruk v. Advanced, Jet Sys., Inc., 296 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Sapp v. Redding, 178 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).1
Further, even if Lustig had rested, it is well-established that in ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal, a trial judge may not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. See Haskin v. Haskin, 677 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Palm Beach Mall, Inc. v. Walker, 585 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Sea Tower Apartments, Inc. v. Century Nat’l Bank, 406 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Rather, such a decision is limited to whether the claimant has submitted a prima facie case. See Sea Tower Apartments, 406 So. 2d at 70.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed. Given the comment by the trial court, the chief judge shall transfer the case to another division.
FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . We are cognizant of the recent decision of the First District in Williams v. Salem Free Will Baptist Church, 784 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), but need not reach the waiver issue addressed in that case as the trial court patently acknowledged Lustig’s attempt at objection.
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Boca Golf View, Ltd. v. Hughes Hall, Inc., 843 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…s claim for breach of contract at the close of its case in a non-jury trial. We reverse. Like a directed verdict in a jury trial, an involuntary dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. See Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Miller v. Nifakos, 655 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). To rule on the motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving every co…
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Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Montes, 156 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…fore bank completed examination of its witness); A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“By denying appellants the opportunity to complete their case-in-chief, the trial court denied appellants their due process.”); Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[A]n involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence.”); SJS Enters. v. Cates, 547 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (trial court cannot “jump the gun” by gran…
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gonzalez, 186 So. 3d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…n in original) (quoting Lorber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)). However, the trial court commits reversible error when it orders an involuntary dismissal before the plaintiff has rested its case. See Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that “an involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence”). Granting a motion for involuntary dismissal before the plaintiff has completed its case has d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnston v. State, 178 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- SEA Tower Apts., Inc. v. Century Nat'l Bank, 406 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- SJS Enters., Inc. v. Cates, 547 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Haskin v. Haskin, 677 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- A.L. Williams v. Salem Free Will Baptist Church, 784 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Yilmaz M. Akdoruk & Faye H. Akdoruk t/a Akdoruk & Assocs. v. Advanced JET Sys., Inc., 296 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Palm Beach Mall, Inc. v. Walker, 585 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)