WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, FSB F/K/A WORLD SAVINGS BANK, FSB, N/K/A WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., APPELLANT,
v.
JOSE R. MONTES; THE UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF JOSE R. MONTES; CATALINA SOLANO; THE UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF CATALINA SOLANO; COURTYARD HOMES AT THE GROVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; THE RIDGES MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, INC.; ANY AND ALL UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, UNDER, AND AGAINST THE HEREIN NAMED INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT(S) WHO ARE NOT KNOWN TO BE DEAD OR ALIVE, WHETHER SAID UNKNOWN PARTIES MAY CLAIM AN INTEREST AS SPOUSES, HEIRS, DEVISEES, GRANTEES, OR OTHER CLAIMANTS; TENANT # 1, TENANT # 2, TENANT # 3, AND TENANT # 4; THE NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS TO ACCOUNT FOR PARTIES IN POSSESSION, APPELLEES
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Wachovia Mortgage appealed the involuntary dismissal of its mortgage foreclosure case after the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss before Wachovia completed presenting its evidence. The appellate court reversed, holding that involuntary dismissals under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) cannot occur before the plaintiff finishes its case-in-chief, and the trial court erred by dismissing the case when the original promissory note was temporarily missing from the court file.
An involuntary dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of its evidence. The trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal and in denying Wachovia's motion for new trial, as Wachovia had scarcely begun presenting its case when the dismissal was granted.
[1] A trial court may not order an involuntary dismissal of a case before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of its evidence.
[2] An involuntary dismissal is appropriate in a bench trial only after the party seeking affirmative relief has completed the presentation of evidence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After a party seeking affirmative relief in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of evidence, any other party may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief”
The controlling rule (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b)) establishing that involuntary dismissals can only be made after the plaintiff completes presenting evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWachovia filed the original promissory note with the court prior to trial. At trial, the original note was missing from the court file. Wachovia sough…
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Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (“Wachovia”) appeals the final judgment entered in favor of the defendants below, Jose R. Montes and Catalina Solano, after its mortgage foreclosure case was involuntarily dismissed at trial. Wachovia argues the trial court erred in involuntarily dismissing the case before Wachovia finished presenting its evidence. We agree, and we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Prior to trial — and as the record clearly indicates — Wachovia filed the original promissory note with the court. At trial, however, the parties discovered that the original note was missing from the court file. Wachovia sought to introduce a copy, but the defendants lodged a best evidence objection, disputed the authenticity of the original, and moved to involuntarily dismiss the case. Without permitting further presentation of evidence, the court summarily granted the motion.
*1106Approximately one week later, the clerk found the original note and returned it via mail to Wachovia. Wachovia promptly moved for rehearing or a new trial, arguing the dismissal was premature and explaining that trial could now proceed with the original note. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment for the defendants.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) governs involuntary dismissals and provides in pertinent part:
After a party seeking affirmative relief in an action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of evidence, any other party may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief, without waiving the right to offer evidence if the motion is not granted. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the party seeking affirmative relief or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence....
(Emphasis added).
In a bench trial, an involuntary dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Boca Golf View, Ltd. v. Hughes Hall, Inc., 843 So.2d 992, 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citations omitted). By definition therefore, Florida courts have held on numerous occasions that, pursuant to rule 1.420(b), a trial court may not order an involuntary dismissal of a case before a plaintiff rests its case. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Santiago, 117 So.3d 1146, 1146-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (reversing trial court’s sua sponte involuntary dismissal of the case entered before bank completed examination of its witness); A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“By denying appellants the opportunity to complete their case-in-chief, the trial court denied appellants their due process.”); Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So.2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[A]n involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence.”); SJS Enters. v. Cates, 547 So.2d 226, 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (trial court cannot “jump the gun” by granting involuntary dismissal while plaintiff was presenting its first witness).
In the instant case, Wachovia had scarcely begun presenting its case when the court noticed that the original note was not in the court file and, as a result, granted the defendants’ motion for involuntary dismissal. Wachovia was denied the opportunity to present any evidence in support of its claim, let alone finish its case-in-chief. The trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion and further erred by denying Wachovia’s motion for a new trial.
Because of this incontrovertible error, as well as the recovery of the original note, the defendants’ arguments pertaining to Wachovia’s ability to prove its case without the note are irrelevant.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
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Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. for J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Tr. 2007-CH1 v. Stone, 174 So. 3d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…... has completed the presentation of evidence, any other party may move for a dismissal on the ground that on the facts and the law the party seeking affirmative relief has shown no right to relief .... ”); see also Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Montes, 156 So. 3d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (agreeing with other Florida courts that “pursuant to rule 1.420(b), a trial court may not order an involuntary dismissal of a case before a plaintiff rests its case.”). This error was compounded by the fact that the tria…
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The Bank OF NEW York Mellon v. Minerva Diaz, 232 So. 3d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…s evidence in its case-in-chief. Fla. R. Civ, P. 1.420(b), Indeed, it is well established that a trial court may not involuntarily dismiss a case prior to the plaintiffs completion of its presentation of evidence. See Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Montes, 156 So. 3d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (finding that the trial court could not involuntarily dismiss mortgagee’s foreclosure action, due to the absence of the original promissory note, from the court file, before mortgagee had finished presenting evidence as par…
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U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Roseman, 214 So. 3d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…b) (2015) (emphasis added). Applying rule 1.420(b)’s plain language emphasized above, we consistently have held that “a trial court may not order an involuntary dismissal of a case before a plaintiff rests its case.” Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Montes, 156 So. 3d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). See also Gonzalez, 186 So. 3d at 1098 (“[I]t was improper to grant the motion for involuntary dismissal before the plaintiff completed its case in chief.”); Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust v. Stone, 174 So. 3d 550, 550 (Fla. 4th…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Boca Golf View, Ltd. v. Hughes Hall, Inc., 843 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- SJS Enters., Inc. v. Cates, 547 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- A.N. and A.N. v. M.F.-A. and J.A., 946 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
- Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Santiago, 117 So. 3d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
- Lustig v. Alina Garcia, 789 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)