LONNIE D. CAMPBELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Campbell challenges sentences imposed in 1999 for resisting a law enforcement officer with violence and accessory after the fact to first degree murder. The trial court failed to timely rule on Rule 3.800(b)(2) motions to correct sentences within 60 days, and any attempt to resentence thereafter was void. The court reverses the original sentences and remands for proper resentencing based on corrected sentencing guidelines scoresheets.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the resentencing orders because it failed to rule on the Rule 3.800(b)(2) motions within 60 days as required by rule, causing the motions to be deemed denied. The November 14, 2000 orders are nullities. The original sentences are reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with the corrected sentencing guidelines scoresheets.
[1] A trial court's failure to enter an amended sentencing order within 60 days of a rule 3.800(b)(1)(B) motion results in the motion being deemed denied.
[2] Orders entered by a trial court after the filing of a notice of appeal and after the time for ruling on a motion to correct sentence has expired are nullities.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no amended order was entered within 60 days from the filing of the motions, as required by rule 3.800(b)(1)(B), and under that applicable version of that rule, the motions are therefore deemed denied.”
Establishes that failure to rule within the statutory period automatically deems motions denied and divests the court of jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCampbell was sentenced on September 14, 1999, in two cases: resisting a law enforcement officer with violence and accessory after the fact to first de…
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BARFIELD, J.
Appellant challenges sentences imposed on September 14, 1999, for resisting a law enforcement officer with violence (Circuit Court Case No. 95-162) and for accessory after the fact to first degree murder (Circuit Court Case No. 98-37).
On April 18, 2000, after the notice of appeal had been filed, he timely filed in the Circuit Court motions to correct the sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Within a month thereafter, the state filed corrected sentencing guidelines scoresheets in both cases, which indicated that the maximum guidelines sentence in 95-162 was 23 months and the maximum guidelines sentence in 98-37 was 62.5 months.
On June 6, 2000, the trial judge acknowledged the corrected scoresheets in a letter to the assistant state attorney, indicating that if the parties agreed that the calculations were correct, “I will enter an amended sentencing order.” However, no amended order was entered within 60 days from the filing of the motions, as required by rule 3.800(b)(1)(B), and under that applicable version of that rule, the motions are therefore deemed denied. Hart v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Kimbrough v. State, 766 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
On November 14, 2000, the trial court entered orders, nunc pro tunc to September 14, 1999, purporting to resen-tence appellant to concurrent terms of 23 months in state prison, followed by 36 months probation in 95-162, and 62.5 months in state prison, followed by 20 years probation in 98-37, with the same conditions that were imposed on September 14, 1999. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter these orders, they are nullities. Hart; Kimbrough.
As the trial court’s belated effort to grant the rule 3.800(b)(2) motions recog nized, they were well founded. The state has conceded that the resentencing orders reflect “the corrections Appellant is entitled to.” Accordingly, the sentences originally imposed on September 14, 1999, are REVERSED, the resentencing orders entered on November 14, 2000, are QUASHED, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the corrected scoresheets.
DAVIS and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…more than sixty days after Maestas filed his motion. Pursuant to rule 3.800(b)(2), the motion is deemed denied and the subsequent order on the motion is a nullity. Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)); Wilson v. State, 853 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). . The facial constitutionality of a statute can be raised for the first time on direct appeal. Jean v. State, 764 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Trushin v. State, 425…
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Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…is deemed denied, and the trial court’s jurisdiction ends, once 60 days elapse without rendition of an order ruling on the motion, and any order rendered more than 60 days after a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is filed is a nullity. See Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), Hart v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and numerous subsequent cases from this court and from other courts. The sentences originally imposed, except for the improperly designated second degree felony, are REVERSED…
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Karlier Robinson v. State, 850 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…urt entered its order in response to appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion more than sixty days after appellant filed his motion, the motion is deemed denied and the order is a nullity. See Fla. R.Crim. Pro. 3.800(b)(2)(B); see also Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order on a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion as no order was entered within sixty days from the filing of the motion, rendering the untimely order a nullity). Appel…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kimbrough v. State, 766 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Duver Caquimbo v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Hart v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)