DOROTHY SESSIONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Dorothy Sessions appealed her 67-month concurrent sentences for nine drug offenses, arguing they were excessive for third-degree felonies. Although the trial court granted her Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error more than 60 days after filing, the court lacked jurisdiction to do so, requiring remand for resentencing within the statutory constraints.
The trial court's February 11, 2005 order granting the motion was a nullity because it was issued more than 60 days after the Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion was filed, at which point the court's jurisdiction ended. The case must be remanded for resentencing consistent with proper sentencing limits for the felony offenses.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on a motion to correct sentencing error under Rule 3.800(b)(2) if no order is rendered within 60 days of the motion's filing.
[2] An order entered by a trial court more than 60 days after the filing of a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is a legal nullity.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A 3.800(b)(2) motion is deemed denied, and the trial court's jurisdiction ends, once 60 days elapse without rendition of an order ruling on the motion, and any order rendered more than 60 days after a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is filed is a nullity.”
Establishes the strict 60-day jurisdictional deadline for trial court action on sentencing correction motions
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 9, 2004, Sessions pleaded guilty to nine drug offenses and admitted probation violations in exchange for concurrent 67-month sentences. S…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Correct Sentencing Error cases and more on FLexlaw
BARFIELD, J.
On September 9, 2004, as the result of plea negotiations, appellant pled guilty to nine drug offenses and admitted violating the conditions of her probation on numerous other convictions, in exchange for concurrent 67-month sentences. On December 3, 2004, while this appeal was pending and before the initial brief was filed, appellant filed a notice in this court that she had filed in the trial court a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). The motion asserted that the 67-month sentences were excessive for third degree felonies. The trial court ordered a response from the state, which acknowledged that the sentences for the third degree felonies exceeded the statutory maximum, but pointed out that the count alleging possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, which was improperly designated on the judgment as a third degree felony, was actually a second degree felony, and that the 67-month sentence for that offense was not illegal.
On February 11, 2005, the trial court entered an order granting the motion as to the third degree felonies and directing the clerk to issue amended judgments and sentences “reflecting a 60 months term on these charges” and correcting the scrivener’s error with respect to the second degree felony. An amended judgment and amended sentences were entered on February 28, 2005. Meanwhile, appellant had filed her initial brief in this appeal on February 23, 2005, asserting that “no amended judgments appear in the record” and that because “no action was taken” on her motion, it was deemed to be denied. She sought “remand for entry of concurrent 60 months sentences.”
The state concedes that under current Florida law, the trial court’s February 11, 2005, order “has no legal effect as it was issued more than 60 days after Appellant’s 3.800(b)(2) motion,” and that she is therefore “entitled to the relief she seeks.” A 3.800(b)(2) motion is deemed denied, and the trial court’s jurisdiction ends, once 60 days elapse without rendition of an order ruling on the motion, and any order rendered more than 60 days after a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion is filed is a nullity. See Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), Hart v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and numerous subsequent cases from this court and from other courts.
The sentences originally imposed, except for the improperly designated second degree felony, are REVERSED. The February 11, 2005, order and the February 28, 2005, judgment and sentence are QUASHED for lack of jurisdiction. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the February 28, 2005, judgment and sentence. Appellant need not be present when the trial court corrects the sentencing errors, Lee v. State, 826 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
ERVIN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
-
Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…s’ rule 3.800 motion, but lowering the additional $25 cost to $15, more than sixty days after Maestas filed his motion. Pursuant to rule 3.800(b)(2), the motion is deemed denied and the subsequent order on the motion is a nullity. Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citing Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)); Wilson v. State, 853 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). . The facial constitutionality of a statute can be raised for the first time on direct appeal. Jean v. S…
-
Jackson v. State, 137 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…costs and the court’s imposition of the investigative costs was based on its own initiative and was not supported by any documentation. The court did not rule on Appellant’s motion within sixty days, and thus it is deemed denied. Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). On appeal, Appellant challenges his sentence arguing that: 1) the sentencing court considered impermissible factors when imposing his sentence; 2) the court erred in denying his 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct illegal senten…
-
Pearce v. State, 968 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…February 7 order setting the restitution payment schedule at $250 per month, and the April 12 order converting all outstanding restitution amounts to a Ken are nullities. Whitmore v. State, 910 So. 2d 308, 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Sessions v. State, 907 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Accordingly, we vacate these orders. Conclusion To summarize, we affirm Mr. Pearce’s judgment and sentence, and we affirm the portion of the restitution order that establishes the restitution amount. We reverse the restit…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Campbell v. State, 789 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- LEE v. State, 826 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Lott v. State, 826 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Duver Caquimbo v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Hart v. State, 773 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)