J.W., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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J.W., a juvenile adjudicated delinquent, sought a stay of his commitment pending appeal. The trial court denied his motion under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.145, and J.W. appealed arguing the court should have applied the Younghans criteria used for adults. The appellate court affirmed, holding that juvenile supersedeas motions are governed exclusively by Rule 8.145, not the adult Younghans standard.
The trial court properly denied the supersedeas motion. Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.145 exclusively governs requests for supersedeas in juvenile cases and does not incorporate the Younghans criteria applicable to adults. The rule requires consideration of the best interests of the child and the public interest, not the Younghans standard.
[1] A trial court must apply the criteria set out in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.145 when considering a juvenile's motion for a stay of commitment pending appeal.
[2] The criteria for granting a stay of commitment pending appeal for juveniles are governed by specific juvenile procedure rules, not by adult criminal procedure rules or pr…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Both the original rule and the current rule direct the trial courts to consider the best interests of the child when determining whether a supersedeas should be granted to a juvenile during appeal. Both rules also state that the rule is "to the exclusion of any other court rule."”
Establishes that Rule 8.145 (and its predecessor) created an exclusive framework for juvenile supersedeas motions separate from adult standards
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.W. was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice. He filed a motion for supersedeas (stay) of the commitment order …
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PER CURIAM.
J.W. was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice. He sought a stay of his commitment order, pending resolution of his appeal from the adjudication of delinquency. The trial court denied the motion based on the criteria set out in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.145, and J.W. is asking this court to review the denial. We affirm the denial.
J.W. argues that the trial court erred in denying the stay because the court did not apply the criteria set out in Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla.1956). He cites A.J. v. Presley, 234 So. 2d 660 (Fla.1970), in support of his contention that Younghans applies to juveniles seeking release pending appeal just as it applies to adults in the same situation. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.591(a). In A.J., the court remanded a juvenile’s request for release pending appeal to the trial court for consideration in the “light of our opinion in Younghans.” A.J., 234 So. 2d at 660.
However, when A.J. was decided no juvenile procedure rules had been adopted. Rules of procedure for juvenile cases became effective in 1973. See In re Transition Rule II, 270 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1972). These transition rules included Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150 which addressed supersedeas on appeal in juve nile cases. Rule 8.150 did not reference Younghans, nor did it adopt the criteria for consideration of bond during appeal set out in Younghans. See 270 So. 2d at 724.
The successor to rule 8.150 is rule 8.145. Both the original rule and the current rule direct the trial courts to consider the best interests of the child when determining whether a supersedeas should be granted to a juvenile during appeal. Both rules also state that the rule is “to the exclusion of any other court rule.” The current rule also requires the trial courts to consider the public interest in reviewing a juvenile’s request for supersedeas. Had the supreme court believed that the Younghans criteria should be applied to juveniles seeking supersedeas, it would have included this direction in the initial juvenile rule or in any subsequent version of the rule adopted within the last twenty-nine years. It has not done so.
Affirmed.
BLUE, C.J., and STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ, Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956)
- Angel v. State, 270 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1972)
- A. J. v. Presley, 234 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1970)