STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ERIC CRENSHAW, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed Eric Crenshaw's sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer and escape, arguing the trial court lacked discretion to refuse sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act after the State filed notice of Crenshaw's qualifications. The appellate court reversed, holding that the prosecutor has discretion to determine whether to impose such sentencing, not the trial court, and that both offenses qualify under the Act.
The trial court lacked discretion; the prosecutor has sole discretion to determine whether to impose prison releasee reoffender sentencing. Both battery on a law enforcement officer and escape are qualifying offenses under the Act. The trial court erred in failing to impose the prescribed sentence, and Crenshaw should be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea on remand.
[1] The discretion to determine whether to impose a sentence pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act belongs to the prosecutor, not the trial court.
[2] A prosecutor, not the trial court, must determine whether extenuating circumstances preclude the imposition of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the discretion to determine whether to impose a sentence pursuant to the Act belonged to the prosecutor and not to the trial court”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that prosecutorial discretion, not judicial discretion, governs application of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEric Crenshaw was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and escape. The State of Florida filed notice that Crenshaw qualified for sentenci…
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WHATLEY, Acting Chief Judge.
The State of Florida appeals Eric Cren-shaw’s sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer and escape, arguing that the trial court did not have discretion in determining whether to sentence Cren-shaw pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the “Act”) after the State filed notice of Crenshaw’s qualifications to be sentenced under such. § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (1997). We reverse.
In State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000), the supreme court held that the discretion to determine whether to impose a sentence pursuant to the Act belonged to the prosecutor and not to the trial court. Here, Crenshaw argues that there were extenuating circumstances in his case, which is one of the exceptions listed in the Act. However, in Cotton, the supreme court held that the prosecutor, not the trial court, must determine whether there are extenuating circumstances precluding the imposition of the Act. Id. at 348.
Crenshaw also argues that neither battery on a law enforcement officer nor escape are enumerated offenses under the Act. We disagree. In Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), this court held that battery on a law enforcement officer is a qualifying offense for prison releasee reoffender sentencing. Further, the escape offense in this case is a qualifying offense under the Act, as it is a felony that involved the use of physical force or violence against an individual. See § 775.082(8)(a)(l)(o). Therefore, the sentences for both battery on a law enforcement officer and escape are qualifying offenses under the Act, and the trial court erred in not sentencing Crenshaw as a prison releasee reoffender. Because Cren-shaw entered a plea based on the trial court’s agreement that he would not be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender, Crenshaw should be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea on remand.
Accordingly, we reverse Crenshaw’s sentences and remand for resentencing. While we recognize the State’s discretion pursuant to the Act, we nevertheless suggest that the State carefully consider the mitigating circumstances in this case in determining whether a prison releasee reoffender sentence is appropriate.
GREEN and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
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State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)…ing that “mere unwanted touching” does not “involve the use or threat of use of physical force or violence.” That holding conflicts with cases from other courts of appeal. See Jenkins v. State, 884 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Branch v. State, 790 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We resolve these conflicts by (A) examining the relevant statutes involve…1 / 2
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State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…avis shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Sentence vacated; and cause remanded with directions. . We have jurisdiction as the order is appeal-able. E.g. State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Stale v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The state’s failure to present evidence that Davis qualified as a prison releasee reoffender is of no moment as the trial court had ruled on the waiver issue and stated it…
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Brinson v. State, 995 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…Brinson was sentenced in 2001, this court had taken the position that BOLEO was a felony involving the use of physical force or violence, and therefore was a qualifying offense for prison releasee reoffender sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The reasoning of these cases apparently served as the basis for concluding that BOLEO was a “forcible felony” and thus a qualifying offense for VCC sentencing. See § 775.084(l)(d…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Carnival Corp. v. Velchez, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)