THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS DAVIS, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appeals a sentencing decision where the trial court imposed a four-year concurrent sentence on a probation violator instead of applying the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act enhancement. The appellate court vacates the sentence, holding that the defendant's rejection of the state's initial plea offer negated any state waiver of PRR sentencing, and the trial court lacked discretion to offer a non-PRR plea bargain.
The trial court lacked discretion to offer Davis a non-PRR plea bargain. The state did not waive sentencing under the PRR Act when Davis rejected the state's initial plea offer, because when an accused voluntarily rejects a plea bargain, he retains no right to the rejected sentence. The court may not impose a guideline sentence if the state seeks sentencing pursuant to the Act and provides sufficient proof that the defendant qualifies as a PRR.
[1] A trial court errs by imposing a non-enhanced sentence when the state properly seeks sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and the defendant qualifies.
[2] A defendant's rejection of a state's initial plea offer negates any claim that the state waived its right to seek enhanced sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When an accused voluntarily chooses to reject or withdraw from a plea bargain, he retains no right to the rejected sentence.”
Establishes the foundational principle that Davis's rejection of the state's initial plea offer negated any waiver of PRR sentencing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was sentenced for a probation violation. The state filed a notice of enhancement under the Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Offender Acts…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
State of Florida appeals defendant’s sentence.1 We vacate the sentence. Upon Davis’s violation of probation for committing a criminal offense, he was sentenced to five years in prison. Although the state had filed a notice of enhancement pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Offender Acts, the state offered Davis a plea to the substantive offense for five years, concurrent and coterminous with the probation violation sentence. Davis, however, rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. During trial, the parties attempted to resolve the case with a plea bargain. Over the state’s objection, Davis accepted the court’s offer of four years in prison concurrent and coterminous with the probation violation sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.
The trial court offered Davis the plea bargain and refused to impose an enhanced sentence based upon the erroneous ruling that the state had waived imposition of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (“Act”) when it offered Davis a non-PRR sentence. Contrary to the court’s ruling, the state did not waive sentencing under the Act as Davis’s rejection of the state’s initial plea offer negated any state waiver. “When an accused voluntarily chooses to reject or withdraw from a plea bargain, he retains no right to the rejected sentence.” Mitchell v. State, 521 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). See Stephney v. State, 564 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The court may not impose a guideline sentence if the state seeks sentencing pursuant to the Act and provides sufficient proof that defendant qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). Thus, the court was without discretion to offer Davis a plea bargain to a non-PRR sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing. On remand, Davis shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Sentence vacated; and cause remanded with directions.
. We have jurisdiction as the order is appeal-able. E.g. State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Stale v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The state’s failure to present evidence that Davis qualified as a prison releasee reoffender is of no moment as the trial court had ruled on the waiver issue and stated its intention to offer Davis a guidelines sentence. See Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d at 1186. It is well settled that the law does not require a useless or futile act. See Plaza v. State, 699 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Young v. State, 664 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Howard v. State, 616 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
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State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…court does not have discretion to depart from the Act’s mandated sentence, and refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence is error as a matter of law. See State v. Smith, 832 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).. Recently, in State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), we vacated a sentence based on the trial judge’s refusal to impose the Act’s enhanced penalties. In Davis, the trial judge believed that the State had waived imposition of the Act’s requirements because it had made a plea offer t…
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State v. Ravann Weaver, 3 So. 3d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…the trial court sentenced defendant to eighteen months in prison with credit for time served. We find that the court was without discretion to deviate downward from the statutory minimum. § 775.087(2)(a)(1)r, Fla. Stat. (2005); see State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). By doing so, the court erred as a matter of law. See State v. Garcia, 923 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing. On remand, the defendant shall be afforded th…
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State v. Baker, 874 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ry once the State proves that the defendant qualifies. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). Thus it has been held that the court cannot offer a plea bargain for a guidelines sentence if the State is seeking a PRR sentence. State v. Davis, 834 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), review denied, 845 So. 2d 888 (Fla.2003) (table decision). Although the State did not proffer the evidence that would support Baker’s PRR classification, the court did not allow the State to even file the PRR notice. “It is well…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Stephney v. State, 564 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Haves v. Haves, 521 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Mitchell v. State, 521 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Broughton Howard v. State, 616 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Gerardo Plaza v. State, 699 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- State v. Chamberlain, 744 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Young v. State, 664 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)