THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANDRES ALEXIS MIRANDA, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's refusal to sentence Miranda as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRRPA) for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. The appellate court affirmed, holding that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not an enumerated offense under the PRRPA at the time of the crime, and that applying a subsequent statutory amendment retroactively would violate ex post facto protections.
The trial court did not err. Burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not an enumerated offense under the PRRPA at the time of the crime, and the statutory amendment effective July 1, 2001, cannot be applied retroactively as doing so would violate ex post facto protections.
[1] Sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA) is not applicable to the crime of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.
[2] Statutory amendments that increase a defendant's potential punishment should not be applied retroactively to crimes committed before the amendments' effective date.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On the date the crime was committed, it was simply not clear from the statute, as it was in effect at the time, that the burglary of an unoccupied dwelling would subject the defendant to sentencing under the PRRPA.”
Establishes that the court is applying the statute as it existed at the time of the crime, not the later amendment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiranda was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. The trial court sentenced him as a Habitual Felony Offender rather than as a Prison Relea…
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NESBITT, Senior Judge.
The State appeals the trial court’s decision to sentence the Defendant, Andres Alexis Miranda, as an Habitual Felony Offender rather than as a Prison Re-leasee Reoffender. The State asserts that the trial court’s refusal to impose an enhanced penalty pursuant to the Prison Re-leasee Reoffender Punishment Act (“PRRPA”), section 775.082(9)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2000), was erroneous.1 We disagree. In State v. Huggins, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S174, — So. 2d -, 2001 WL 278107 (Fla. Mar. 22, 2001), the Florida Supreme Court held that sentencing under the PRRPA was not applicable to the crime of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. In the instant case Defendant was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling; hence, the PRRPA could not be used to enhance the sentence imposed. See Merson v. State, 786 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(concluding that burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not an enumerated offense under the PRRPA); See Roundtree v. State, 786 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Cruz-Bertances v. State, 786 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The State characterizes statutory amendments made to section 775.082(9)(a)(l), effective July 1, 2001, as solely a “clarification” of existing law,2 thus permitting the PRRPA sentencing sought in the instant case. We cannot agree. On the date the crime was committed, it was simply not clear from the statute, as it was in effect at the time, that the burglary of an unoccupied dwelling would subject the defendant to sentencing under the PRRPA. As State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla.1989), makes clear, such statutory changes should not be applied retroactively to increase a defendant’s sentence. It is firmly established law that the statutes in effect at the time of commission of a crime control as to the offenses for which the perpetrator can be convicted, as well as the punishments which may be imposed. See also McFadden v. State, 737 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla.1999); Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1991); Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552, 555 (1897)(“[W]here a statute of this kind [penal statute] contains such an ambiguity as to leave reasonable doubt of its meaning, where it admits of two constructions, that which operates in favor of life or liberty is to be preferred.”)
Thus we conclude, as did the court in Smith, 547 So. 2d at 616, the amended statute, if given retroactive effect, would result in additional punishment for appellant, running afoul of the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (statute reducing gain time credits is ex post facto when applied to a prisoner whose crime was committed before the amendment); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)(applying amended sentencing guidelines having effect of increasing sentence for crime committed prior to effective date of amendment violates ex post facto clause).
Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.
. While it does not change the result in this case, the State is correct in arguing that the discretion whether to impose a sentence pursuant to the PRRPA belongs to the prosecutor and not the trial court. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000)(concluding that PRRPA, which removes substantially all sentencing discretion from judicial branch and places it instead in executive branch, does not encroach on judiciary's sentencing function in violation of doctrine of separation of powers).
. Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2000) provides in part:
1. "Prison releasee reoffender” means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit:
... q. Burglary of an occupied structure or dwelling;
The statute as amended effective July 1, 2001, reads:
... q. Burglary of a dwelling or occupied structure.
Chapter 2001-39, Laws of Florida.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Connolly v. State, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…Statutes....” ."It is firmly established law that the statutes in effect at the time of commission of a crime control as to the offenses for which the perpetrator can be convicted, as well as the punishments which may be imposed.” State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). . When I refer to an "uncharged," weapon in this dissent, I mean that the firearm used as the basis to reclassify the conviction is not the one specifically referred to in the charge of first-degree murder in Count 1 of th…
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Foster v. State, 861 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…committed.”); State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla.1989); Booker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1079, 1082-83 (Fla.1987); State v. Eldredge, 801 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Rock v. State, 800 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Heath v. State, 532 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). See also Fla. Const., Art. I, § 10 (“No ... ex post facto law ... shall be passed.”). These constitutional restrictions6 on retrospective criminal statutes apply with fu…1 / 2
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Carlton Rock v. State, 800 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…e unpersuasive. “It is firmly established law that the statutes in effect at the time of commission of a crime control as to the offenses for which the perpetrator can be convicted, as well as the punishments which may be imposed.” State v. Miranda, 793 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(holding that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act could not be used to enhance the sentence imposed where the defendant was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling). In this case, Rock committed the offenses…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981)
- Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1987)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989)
- Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)
- Ex-Parte E. W. Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 (Fla. 1897)
- Dax Anthony Rodriguez v. State, 773 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- McFADDEN v. State, 737 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1999)
- Cruz-Bertances v. State, 786 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Dolinger v. State, 786 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)