CHARLES LONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trial court's order striking appellant's pro se postconviction motion was reversed because the court failed to follow required procedures under State v. Spencer, which mandates a show cause order before barring further pro se filings.
Before prohibiting a litigant from filing further pro se attacks on conviction and sentence, the trial court must address the merits of the claims and, if imposing the sanction, provide notice and opportunity to respond via show cause order.
[1] Before barring a litigant from filing further pro se attacks on conviction and sentence, the trial court must address the merits of the claims and provide notice and oppo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“because there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the proper procedures were followed before Appellant was restricted from filing future pro se pleadings, the cause should be remanded for reconsideration pursuant to State v. Spencer”
State's concession regarding the trial court's failure to follow required procedures
Appellant filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court struck on grounds of abuse of process and a prior court order barring…
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BROWNING, J.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s order striking his pro se motion for postconviction relief.
The trial court struck Appellant’s motion on grounds that Appellant had abused the postconviction process and had been previously barred by court order from filing pro se motions.
Appellant argues the trial court erred by striking his motion, because the trial court failed to enter a show cause order before entering its order barring him from further pro se filings. This Court issued a Toler1 order directing the State to respond to Appellant’s contention.
The State responded and conceded that “[b]ecause there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the proper procedures were followed before Appellant was restricted from filing future pro se pleadings, the cause should be remanded for reconsideration pursuant to State v. Spencer, [751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla.1999)].” Under Spencer and its progeny, before prohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence, the trial court must first address the merits of the claims, and if it then chooses to pursue the sanction of barring further pro se filings, provide the litigant with notice of the intended sanction and afford the litigant an opportunity to respond through issuance of a show cause order. See id.; see also Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for reconsideration pursuant to State v. Spencer. ALLEN, C.J., and VAN NORTWICK, J., CONCUR. . Toler v. State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
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Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…(“To achieve the best balance of a litigant’s right of access to courts and the need of the courts to prevent repetitious and frivolous pleadings, it is important for courts to first provide notice and an opportunity to respond....”); Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Norton v. State, 745 So. 2d 495, 495 (Fla. 1st DCA [*480] 1999); see also Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398, 399^00 (Fla.2001) (barring Mr. Jackson from filing any future pro se petitions in the Florida Suprem…
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Petty v. State, 926 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…has consistently reversed trial court orders which bar future pro se filings that are imposed without providing the required notice and opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). [*446] On appeal the appellant argues, and the State concedes, that no such notice and opportunity to respond was provided. Accordingly, that part of the trial court’s order barring future pro se filings is REVERSED and the caus…
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Orin A. Mims v. State, 994 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…urt, it must address the merits of the claims advanced by the litigant and determine that they are frivolous before commencing down the road to bar future filings.”); see also Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Longv. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). . We applaud the dissent’s encomium to Clarence Gideon. See infra pp. 1236-37. We also agree that all too often, prisoners abuse their postconviction rights. See infra p. 1238. The dissent makes a fine case that Mr. Mims should…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
- Toler v. State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Exum Walker v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Abram Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)