DOUGLAS M. JACKSON, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
GARY PARKHOUSE, LIBRARIAN; JIM WITT, ASSISTANT WARDEN; C. WHITE-HOUSE, COLONEL; MICHAEL W. MOORE, SECRETARY, APPELLEES
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Douglas Jackson challenged a trial court order dismissing his mandamus petition and barring him from filing pro se cases in the Third Judicial Circuit. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of the mandamus petition but reversed the pro se filing bar, holding that such a sanction requires prior notice and opportunity to be heard.
The dismissal of the mandamus petition is affirmed because Jackson failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not pursuing formal grievances and administrative appeals. However, the bar on pro se filings is reversed because such a sanction cannot be imposed without first issuing an order to show cause that gives the litigant notice and opportunity to be heard.
[1] A petition for writ of mandamus against the Department of Corrections or its employees in their official capacities requires the petitioner to plead and prove exhaustion…
[2] Failure to file formal grievances and administrative appeals to the Secretary of the Department constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies for purposes of a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in order to be entitled to any mandamus relief against the Department of Corrections or its employees in their official capacities, Mr. Jackson was required to plead and prove that he had exhausted administrative remedies”
Establishes the requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking mandamus relief against corrections department
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson, an inmate in the Department of Corrections, filed a mandamus petition alleging that departmental employees denied him access to courts in vio…
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PER CURIAM.
Douglas M. Jackson, Sr., appeals a final order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus as frivolous, and barring him from making any future pro se filings in the Third Judicial Circuit. We do not disturb the dismissal of the mandamus petition, but we reverse the bar on pro se filings on the authority of State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla.1999), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In his petition, Mr. Jackson asserted that the Department of Corrections and certain named departmental employees both denied him access to the courts in violation of the constitution, see Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const., and violated administrative rules of the Department, see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.015(2), 33-501.301(8)(a) & 33-602.402(7) (transferred to 33-210.102(7)), when they limited the amount of paper, pens, and grievance forms he could receive at any one time.
Whether or not the trial court’s views on the merits were correct, in order to be entitled to any mandamus relief against the Department of Corrections or its employees in their official capacities, Mr. Jackson was required to plead and prove that he had exhausted administrative remedies. See Park v. Dugger, 548 So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Millard v. State, 503 So. 2d 939, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Sawyer v. Wainwright, 422 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Morris v. Wainwright, 409 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Jones v. Wainwright, 298 So. 2d 542, 542-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); see generally 41 FI. Jur.2d Prisons and Prisoners § 213 (“Judicial Relief; Necessity of Exhausting Administrative Remedies”).
He did not meet that burden because he alleged only that he had filed informal grievances under Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.005. See Adams v. Barton, 507 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
He failed to follow up with formal grievances, see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006, and administrative appeals to the Secretary of the Department, see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007, before initiating the mandamus proceeding in circuit court.
We reverse the order insofar as it bars Mr. Jackson from making any future pro se filings in the Third Judicial Circuit. Before imposing such a sanction, a court must first issue an order to show cause in order to afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Spencer, 751 So. 2d at 48 (“To achieve the best balance of a litigant’s right of access to courts and the need of the courts to prevent repetitious and frivolous pleadings, it is important for courts to first provide notice and an opportunity to respond....”); Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Norton v. State, 745 So. 2d 495, 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see also Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398, 399^00 (Fla.2001) (barring Mr. Jackson from filing any future pro se petitions in the Florida Supreme Court after issuing an order to show cause).
In the present case, the Department moved to bar Mr. Jackson from making any future filings without first paying a filing fee and Mr. Jackson responded to that motion, but he had no prior notice of the sanction ultimately imposed by the trial court. Mr. Jackson did not receive notice of the trial court’s intention to bar pro se filings altogether or an opportunity to respond, before the trial court imposed the bar. We deny relief as to that portion of the order dismissing the petition for writ of mandamus, but reverse that portion of the order barring all pro se filings prospectively, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH, BENTON, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Petty v. State, 926 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…(Fla.1999). Following the holding of Spencer, this Court has consistently reversed trial court orders which bar future pro se filings that are imposed without providing the required notice and opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). [*446] On appeal the appellant argues, and the State concedes, that no such notice and opportunity to respond was provided. Accordingly, that part of the trial court’s ord…
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Conraad L. Hoever v. FLA. Dept. OF Corr., 156 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.007, an inmate may appeal the result of a formal grievance to the Office of the Secretary, and indeed, must take such an appeal to exhaust his administrative remedies. See, e.g., Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.006(8) contains the mailing procedures for such inmate grievances: (8) Mailing Procedures. The warden or person designated in Rule 33-103.002, F.A.C., shall establish a procedure in…
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Toliver v. Crews, 146 So. 3d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…ers that bar future pro se filings imposed without providing the required notice and opportunity to be heard. See Hall v. Knight, 986 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Petty v. State, 926 So. 2d 445, 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Jackson v. Parkhouse, 826 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Here, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court issued the required show cause order. As such, we deny relief as to that portion of the order dismiss…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
- Jackson v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 790 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2001)
- Millard v. State, 503 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Millard Whitfield v. State, 409 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Holmes v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 409 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Sawyer v. Louie L. Wainwright and G. Strickland, 422 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Jones v. Louie L. Wainwright, 298 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Adams v. Barton, 507 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Mickey A. Park v. Dugger, 548 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)