STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
VINCENT S. WHITE, APPELLEE
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The State appeals the dismissal of criminal mischief and battery charges against Vincent White on statute of limitations grounds. The court reverses, holding that prosecution was timely commenced when an information was filed, a plea was entered, and arraignment was conducted, even though the defendant subsequently failed to appear and was not arrested until eleven years later.
Prosecution was timely commenced no later than the date of White's arraignment in June 1989. The filing of the information combined with the formal arraignment proceedings and pretrial scheduling constituted 'other process' sufficient to commence prosecution under § 775.15(5), regardless of White's later failure to appear.
[1] A prosecution is commenced when an information is filed and process issued on that information is executed without unreasonable delay.
[2] When a defendant is represented by counsel, files a plea, and is arraigned, "other process" sufficient to commence prosecution under the statute of limitations has occurr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.”
Establishes the statutory requirement for commencing prosecution under § 775.15(5)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWhite was arrested in May 1989 for crimes committed in April 1989. The State filed an information on May 17, 1989, and White's public defender filed a…
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NORTHCUTT, Acting Chief Judge.
The circuit court dismissed charges of criminal mischief and battery against Vincent White on the basis that the State did not commence his prosecution within the statutory limitations period. § 775.15(5), Fla.' Stat. (1987).1 The State appeals the dismissal and we reverse.
The charged crimes took place in April 1989. White was arrested and the public defender’s office was appointed to repre sent him. He was apparently in custody on May 17, 1989, when the State filed the information against him. His public defender filed a written plea of not guilty on May 18, 1989. Arraignment was held in June, based on the written plea, and pretrial was set for July 17, 1989. White failed to appear at pretrial, and a capias was issued for his arrest based on his failure to appear and the charges in the information.
White was finally arrested on the capias on April 8, 2000. He filed a written plea of not guilty and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the State had not commenced his prosecution within the applicable statutes of limitations. The State must begin a prosecution for criminal mischief within three years from the date the crime was committed, and a prosecution for battery within two years. § 775.15(2)(b), (c), Fla. Stat. (1989). “A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1989).
The circuit court granted White’s motion and dismissed the charges on the authority of State v. Watkins, 685 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Since the circuit court’s order in this case, we have distinguished Watkins in circumstances very similar to the ones here. See State v. Martinez, 790 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Young v. State, 784 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
As we explained in Martinez, where the defendant is represented, files a plea and is arraigned, “other process” sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) has occurred. Cf. Watkins, 685 So. 2d at 1324-25 (Altenbernd, J. concurring) (positing “if a defendant were formally notified of his or her arraignment date at first appearance that would be sufficient “other process” to commence prosecution under section 775.15, if an information had been filed).
Even if White did not have personal knowledge that the information was filed, arraignment conducted and pretrial scheduled, his attorney did, and the attorney’s knowledge is imputed to his client. State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (holding that when counsel was present when a trial date was announced and received written notice of the date, even though the client did not receive notice, the attorney’s knowledge was imputed to the client).
Under these facts we hold that prosecution commenced no later than the date of White’s arraignment.
We reverse the order dismissing the charges and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
DAVIS and SILBERMAN, JJ., concur. . The 1987 version of Florida Statutes governs this case. Brown v. State, 674 So. 2d 738, 739 n. 1. (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (noting that applicable statutes of limitation are the ones in effect at the time of the acts giving rise to the criminal charges).
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Thompson v. State, 1 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…iled” and that an arraignment was scheduled on the felony charge. Although the record does not reflect whether petitioner was present at the hearing when his counsel was so advised, [*1111] notice to counsel is imputed to his client. State v. White, 794 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In addition, petitioner was mailed a notice to appear for arraignment on the felony charge.3 Hence, the state did not lull petitioner into believing that the charges against him had been abandoned, and the state did not interfere…
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Starling v. State, 799 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…“other process” provision of the statute was satisfied when the defendant, through his attorney, filed a written waiver of formal arraignment, a plea of not guilty, and a demand for discovery after the information was filed. See also State v. White, 794 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that “other process” sufficient to commence prosecution occurred prior to defendant’s arraignment); State v. Martinez, 790 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA) (same), rev. dismissed, 794 So. 2d 605 (Fla.2001). In the instant case, h…
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McLAUGHLIN v. State, 15 So. 3d 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…es agree [*875] that the amendment does not apply to McLaughlin’s crimes allegedly committed in March 1996 because the applicable version of the statute of limitations is the one in effect when the alleged crimes were committed.1 See State v. White, 794 So. 2d 682, 682 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). On appeal, the State does not contend that it was excused from timely commencing the prosecution. Rather, the State contends that by May 21, 1996, the date the capias was requested, the prosecution had commenced becaus…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 674 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- State v. Watkins, 685 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- State v. Martinez, 790 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Wheeler v. State, 784 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Hala Massani v. Classic Cuts Plus, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)