JONATHAN MCKINNEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2001-09-07
No. 2D00-2048
FULMER, A.C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur.
796 So. 2d 579 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2001) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed Jonathan McKinney's armed burglary conviction because circumstantial evidence failed to prove he was the one who took the shotgun, though evidence clearly supported a simple burglary conviction. The court found that the evidence was consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence—that another intruder took the gun—and therefore did not meet the required standard for a circumstantial evidence conviction.


Holding

The court held that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove armed burglary because it was consistent with the reasonable hypothesis that another intruder took the shotgun. The court reversed the armed burglary conviction but affirmed the underlying simple burglary conviction, directing the trial court to resentence McKinney accordingly.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for armed burglary cannot be sustained if the evidence fails to prove the defendant was armed.

[2] In circumstantial evidence cases, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

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Key Quotes

“Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”

States the governing legal standard for reviewing circumstantial evidence convictions

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Facts & Procedural History

McKinney was convicted of armed burglary based on circumstantial evidence that he burglarized a home during a five-day period when the owner was away.…

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Opinion of the Court
NORTHCUTT, Judge.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

We reverse Jonathan McKinney’s conviction for armed burglary because the evidence failed to prove that he was armed. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to acquit McKinney of armed burglary, adjudicate him guilty of the lesser offense of simple burglary, and resentence him.

McKinney was convicted based on circumstantial evidence that he burgled a home at some point during a five-day period when the owner, an acquaintance of McKinney’s, was away. The State contended McKinney committed armed burglary because one of the items discovered missing when the homeowner returned was a shotgun. The gun was never recovered.

McKinney does not dispute that the evidence supported a burglary conviction, but he argues that there was inadequate proof that he took the shotgun. He points out that the owner spent five days away from the home. It could have been entered more than once during that time. . Although the police found McKinney’s fingerprints at the scene, there were other fingerprints that could not be linked to him, to the homeowner, or to the homeowner’s other acquaintances.

Further, McKinney was not charged with the thefts of two automobiles which were stolen from the premises during the same period. A third car was equipped with a “kill switch” which prevented the car from starting unless a numeric code was punched into its keypad. The device was armed while the owner was away. When she returned home, she discovered that the car’s battery had been discharged, as if someone had repeatedly attempted to start the car without entering the code. The owner acknowledged that McKinney was aware of the device, but did not know the code.

A special standard of review applies in circumstantial evidence cases. State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989). “Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court must determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences. Id. at 189.

Here, the evidence supported an inference that McKinney stole the shotgun and therefore possessed it during his burglary of the home, but the proof did not contradict his theory that another intruder took the gun. Because the State’s evidence was not inconsistent with this reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we reverse the armed burglary conviction. The trial court shall acquit McKinney of that charge, adjudicate him guilty of simple burglary, and resentence him accordingly.

FULMER, A.C.J., and DAVIS, J., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Johnekins v. State, 823 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …arized at any point between December 22 and the defendant’s entry on December 27. Indeed, on [*255] the morning of December 27, Exclusive’s employee had come to pick up a drill and everything was in order. The defendant relies on McKinney v. State, 796 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), but in that case the court cited fingerprint and other evidence it regarded as sufficiently demonstrating that more than one perpetrator had entered the premises. Further, in our case (unlike McKinney), the employee entered the w…
  • State v. Fagan, 857 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …2001) (affirming denial of judgment of acquittal in a murder case when the defense theory was that another person at the scene committed the murder, but competent evidence did not exclude the defendant’s culpability). Fagan cites McKinney v. State, 796 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), but the case is not to the contrary. In McKinney, the defendant was convicted of armed burglary based on circumstantial evidence that the defendant entered a house while unarmed, stole a shotgun from within the house, and possess…
  • Tonge v. State, 925 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …is claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Corzo v. State, 806 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We affirm as to his remaining claims, only one of which warrants discussion. Citing this court’s decision in McKinney v. State, 796 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), Tonge argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment [*1108] of acquittal on the armed burglary and grand theft of a firearm charges. We disagree. Although the evidence here may have supported Tonge’s…

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