EUGENIO J. AMADOR, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDITH A. AMADOR, APPELLEE
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A former husband appealed an order denying his motion for attorney's fees in a family law dispute. The trial court granted the former wife's directed verdict motion after the close of evidence, finding insufficient proof of a fee agreement. The appellate court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion by denying the former husband's motion to reopen the case to present evidence of the retainer agreement.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen the case. Assuming arguendo that the directed verdict was properly entered, trial courts have broad discretion to allow parties to reopen their cases and present additional evidence, and reopening here would not have unfairly prejudiced the former wife or disserved justice.
[1] A trial court has broad discretion to allow a party to reopen its case to present additional evidence, even after the close of all evidence or after directing a verdict.
[2] Denying a motion to reopen a case to present evidence of a fee agreement, when such evidence would not unfairly prejudice the opposing party and would serve the interests…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As a general rule, the trial court has broad discretion to allow a party to reopen its case and present additional evidence, whether it does so after a party rests, after the close of all evidence, or even after having directed a verdict for one party.”
Establishes the foundational principle that trial courts have broad discretion to permit case reopening at various procedural stages.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court initially ruled that the former husband was entitled to attorney's fees following successful motions to recover property from the form…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Eugenio Amador, the former husband, appeals an order denying his motion for attorney’s fees. We reverse.
The trial court ruled that the former husband was entitled to attorney’s fees following successful motions to recover property from the former wife. At the fee hearing, after the close of evidence the former wife moved for a directed verdict based on the lack of evidence as to the former husband’s fee agreement. In response, the former husband moved to reopen the case and to introduce evidence as to the agreement. The court denied the motion and granted the former wife’s motion for directed verdict based on the former husband’s failure “to prove all of the necessary elements to establish an amount for the award of attorney’s fees[.]” On appeal, the former husband argues that the record contains evidence sufficient to preclude a directed verdict and that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen the case. Assuming, arguendo, that the directed verdict was properly entered, the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen the case to present evidence as to the agreement. See Camena Invs. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). “As a general rule, the trial court has broad discretion to allow a party to reopen its case and present additional evidence, whether it does so after a party rests, after the close of all evidence, or even after having directed a verdict for one party[.]” Silber v. Cn’R Indus. of Jacksonville, Inc., 526 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
Here, granting the motion to reopen the case to introduce the limited evidence at issue would not have unfairly prejudiced the former wife and would have served the best interest of justice. See Hernandez v. Cacciamani Dev. Co., 698 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Bieley v. Bieley, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 8d DCA 1981); Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
The former husband merely sought to prove that he had a retainer agreement with counsel for legal services thereby establishing “the true state of the facts by [presenting] additional evidence of existing facts inadvertently omitted.” Silber, 526 So. 2d at 978(emphasis omitted); Hernandez, 698 So. 2d at 929; Bieley, 398 So. 2d at 935; Akins, 314 So. 2d at 14.
Accordingly, we remand this cause for the court to admit evidence of the fee agreement, and to award fees and costs to the former husband.
Reversed and remanded.
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Aills v. Luciano Boemi, M.D., 41 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…er case-in-chief, the trial court had broad discretion to allow her to reopen her case to present additional evidence. See RNK Family Ltd. P’ship v. Alexander-Mitchell [*1026] Assocs., 890 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Amador v. Amador, 796 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)). Our review of the trial court’s ruling permitting Ms. Aills to reopen her case after resting is for abuse of discretion. See Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v. Futch, 232 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); Thrifty Super Market…
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Robinson v. Weiland, 936 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…al court should consider in determining whether to reopen the case to allow presentation of additional evidence include whether the opposing party will be unfairly prejudiced and whether it will serve the best interests of justice. Amador v. Amador, 796 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Hernandez v. Cacciamani Dev. Co., 698 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Silber; Bieley v. Bieley, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1981); Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); see also R…
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Grider-Garcia v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 73 So. 3d 847 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…a trial court has broad discretion to allow a party to reopen its case and present additional evidence, whether it does so after a party rests, after the close of all evidence, or even after having directed a verdict for one party. Amador v. Amador, 796 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). In determining whether to permit a party to reopen his case, the court should consider (1) the timeliness of the request, (2) the character of the evidence sought to be introduced, (3) the effect of allowing the evidence to…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Silber v. Cn'R Indus. OF Jacksonville, Inc., 526 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Akins v. Taylor, 314 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Camena Invs. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Hernandez v. Cacciamani Dev. Co. & Luciano Cacciamani, 698 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Emporium v. Eason, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Bieley v. Bieley, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)