WASHINGTON LOUIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Washington Louis challenged the revocation of his probation based on pending criminal charges for which he was subsequently acquitted, and sought jail credit for time spent in custody awaiting trial on those charges. The court affirmed the probation revocation but reversed on the jail credit issue, remanding for entry of an order crediting 280 days of jail time against his sentence.
The trial court did not err in revoking probation because different standards of proof apply—probation violations require only a preponderance of the evidence while criminal convictions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the trial court erred by failing to grant Louis credit for 280 days of jail time served in connection with the pending charges.
[1] A trial court may revoke probation based on charges for which the defendant is subsequently acquitted, as the standard of proof for probation revocation (preponderance of…
[2] A defendant is entitled to jail credit for time served awaiting trial on charges that led to the revocation of their probation.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fact that appellant was acquitted of aggravated battery by a jury does not mean that his probation could not be revoked based on the same facts.”
Establishes that acquittal on criminal charges does not preclude probation revocation based on the same conduct
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLouis pleaded no contest to robbery on March 3, 1999, and received 26 months of probation as a habitual offender. On May 10, 1999, he was charged with…
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PER CURIAM.
We deny appellant’s motion for rehearing, but withdraw our opinion dated August 22, 2001, and substitute in its place this opinion.
Washington Louis appeals from an order summarily denying his rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. He contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation on the basis of charges for which he was subsequently acquitted, and that the court further erred by not awarding him jail credit against the sentence he received for violating probation for the time he spent in jail awaiting his trial on the pending charges. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On March 3, 1999, appellant pled “no contest” to a charge of robbery. The court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to twenty-six months of probation as a habitual offender. On May 10, 1999, appellant was charged with armed robbery, home invasion, attempted murder, and aggravated battery (hereinafter “pending charges”). He pled “not guilty” to these charges. The state sought to revoke his probation and appellant pled “not guilty” to violating probation as well.
On July 2, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the VOP charge and found appellant in violation based on his arrest and the pending charges. The court sentenced appellant to thirty years imprisonment. Appellant spent 280 days in the county jail awaiting his trial on the pending charges and was eventually acquitted on March 3, 2000. Appellant has not demonstrated that because he was later acquitted of the pending charges that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation. Different standards of proof apply. See Gonzales v. State, 780 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“The fact that appellant was acquitted of aggravated battery by a jury does not mean that his probation could not be revoked based on the same facts.”); State v. Jenkins, 762 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“To meet its burden in a violation of probation proceeding, the state need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the subject offense. As that is a lesser standard than is required to prove the criminal charge, the state may still have sufficient evidence to meet its lesser burden.”); Morris v. State, 727 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the judge from determining that probation violation has occurred based on the same conduct because a criminal case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and a probation violation need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).
We do, however, find merit in appellant’s second claim that he is entitled to credit for the 280 days he spent in the county jail awaiting his trial on the pending charges. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“when a defendant is arrested and placed in jail while on probation or parole, he is entitled to credit for time served on his original charge once his probation or parole is revoked....”); Gordon v. State, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (holding it was error not to give a defendant credit for time spent in jail where he was held on a charge that prompted revocation of his probation). We, therefore, reverse on this issue and remand with directions that an order be entered granting appellant credit for his jail time served in connection with the pending charges.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
DELL, WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Kendrigan v. State, 941 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…sought additional jail credit. Appellant is entitled to credit for time served in jail from the' date of his arrest for the new offenses if the new offenses constituted the basis for the revocation of probation in the instant cases. Louis v. State, 797 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Thompson v. Wainwright, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Pauldo v. State, 390 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Gordon v. State, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Voulo v. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla.1…
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Douglas v. State, 43 So. 3d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…dduced at the jury trial for the robbery. The law is well-settled that, because different standards of proof apply, a violation of probation can be based on criminal conduct for which a defendant is subsequently acquitted by a jury. Louis v. State, 797 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Morris v. State, 727 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In a jury trial, the State must prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in a VOP proceeding, the State need merely prove the violation by a greater weight of the…
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W.B.S. v. State, 851 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…’s double jeopardy rights. See Caldwell v. State, 803 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). However, as the State argues, W.B.S. could still be found in violation of community control based on the facts establishing the felony battery. See Louis v. State, 797 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). A violation of community control needs to be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith v. State, 788 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Here, the State showed by a preponderance of…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morris v. State, 727 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- State v. Jenkins, 762 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Gonzales v. State, 780 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Joyner v. Karsner, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Gordon v. State, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Clark v. The Honorable Edward N. Moore, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Thompson v. Louie L. Wainwright, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)