MARTIN KENDRIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed the trial court's denial of a Rule 3.800(a) motion for additional jail credit, holding that a defendant is entitled to credit for time served from arrest on new offenses if those offenses were the basis for probation revocation.
A defendant is entitled to jail credit for time served from arrest on new offenses through sentencing following probation revocation if the new offenses constituted the basis for revocation.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for time served in jail from the date of arrest on new offenses through sentencing following probation revocation if the new offenses co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKendrigan sought additional jail credit via a Rule 3.800(a) motion after his probation was revoked based on new offenses.…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion, which sought additional jail credit. Appellant is entitled to credit for time served in jail from the' date of his arrest for the new offenses if the new offenses constituted the basis for the revocation of probation in the instant cases. Louis v. State, 797 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Thompson v. Wainwright, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Pauldo v. State, 390 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Gordon v. State, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). See also Voulo v. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla.1974) (explaining that a defendant cannot be on parole and in jail at the same time). If this is the case, appellant should receive credit from the date of his arrest for the new offenses through the date of sentencing following revocation of probation in these cases.
On remand, if the new offenses were not the basis for revocation, the trial court must attach record evidence showing that appellant was not in jail on both the new charges and the violation charges at the same time. See Diggs v. State, 727 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Davis v. State, 543 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). See also Lavrich v. State, 633 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
WARNER, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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McCool v. State, 211 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…la. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that the appellant was entitled to the 61 days of jail credit previously awarded as a time served sentence as well as any additional time served in jail before the revocation of probation and sentence); Kendrigan v. State, 941 So. 2d 529, 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“Appellant is entitled to credit for time served in jail from the date of his arrest for the new offenses if the new offenses constituted the basis for the revocation of probation in the instant cases.”). REVERSED and REM…
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Tarique A. Bagley v. State, 96 So. 3d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…y to two other opinions, issued prior to Ransone, that appear to improperly apply the rule announced in Gordon to a VOP sentence imposed consecutively to sentence(s) for the new offense(s) that violated the defendant’s probation: Kendrigan v. State, 941 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) and Lavrich v. State, 633 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Even after Ransone, a trial court retains the discretion to award pyramiding credit for consecutive sentences. See e.g., Gregg v. State, 43 So. 3d 818, 819 (Fla. 1st DCA…
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Eon G. Cooper v. State, 967 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…89, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(reeog-nizing in a similar situation that a defendant’s sentencing documents need to reflect award of unforfeited prison credit). As for the time appellant spent in the Broward County jail, he relies on Kendrigan v. State, 941 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) for his contention that he is entitled to credit in this proceeding for the time served in the Broward County jail. However, Kendrigan is inapposite as it awarded credit for jail time from the date of arrest for the new offenses…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Voulo v. Louie L. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1974)
- Hammer v. State, 543 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Washington Louis v. State, 797 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Joyner v. Karsner, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Gordon v. State, 379 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Lavrich v. State, 633 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Clark v. The Honorable Edward N. Moore, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Thompson v. Louie L. Wainwright, 447 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Alton Eugene Diggs v. State, 727 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Pauldo v. State, 390 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)