THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ADAM L. HARWOOD, APPELLEE
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The court held that collateral estoppel does not bar prosecution of the severed count because the jury's acquittal did not necessarily determine the issue of whether the defendant possessed a firearm.
The defendant was acquitted of several charges, including armed burglary and robbery. The State then sought to prosecute a severed count of unlawful p…
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PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida appeals from an order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss a severed count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal. We reverse.
After the defendant was acquitted by a jury of several charges, including burglary with assault or battery while armed, robbery using a deadly weapon or firearm, and kidnaping with a weapon, the defendant moved to dismiss the severed count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a violent career criminal. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion finding that the prosecution of the charge was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The State contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. We agree.
In Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820, 104 S.Ct. 83, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983), the Florida Supreme Court held that “the test to determine whether collateral estoppel acts as a bar to further prosecution is not whether the factual issue in question was inherently decided by the jury’s prior verdict, but rather whether such factual issue was actually decided by the jury in reaching its verdict.” A review of the record indicates that collateral estoppel does not bar prosecution of the severed count because the issue of whether the defendant possessed a firearm was not necessarily determined by the jury. The jury’s decision to acquit the defendant could have been grounded on an issue other than whether the defendant possessed a firearm during the incident. See Garcia v. State, 591 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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Morris v. State, 869 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…possessed a firearm during the very same armed robbery. See id.; see also Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204, 1206-08 (Fla.1983); State v. Short, 513 So. 2d 679, 681-82 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). [*1266] The State argues that the decision in State v. Harwood, 800 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), supports the ruling below, but that is not so. In Harwood the defendant was charged with armed robbery and other offenses at his first trial, at which he was acquitted. Id. at 308. Thereafter the State proceeded against the defen…
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Jackson v. State, 183 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…y and still acquitted the defendant on all charges. Here, in contrast, the jury could have accepted some of Daniels’ testimony (e.g., that Jackson possessed a firearm) and still acquitted him of aggravated assault. The decision in State v. Harwood, 800 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), supports the above analysis. The pertinent facts of Harwood are as follows: [*1215] After the defendant was acquitted by a jury of several charges, including burglary with assault or battery while armed, robbery using a deadly we…
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Antwane M. Ferguson v. State, 946 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…he evidence only identified the robber in possession of the firearm. Id. at 1266. In contrast, a defendant charged with armed robbery and acquitted was allowed subsequently to be prosecuted for unlawful possession of a firearm in State v. Har-wood, 800 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The parties agreed in the first trial that there was an encounter between the defendant and victims, but disagreed on what happened during the encounter. Id. at 309. Whether the defendant actually possessed a firearm was not nece…
Authorities Cited
- Von Dee Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1983)
- California v. Harvier, 464 U.S. 820 (U.S. 1983)
- Kaushiva v. Hotter, 464 U.S. 820 (U.S. 1983)
- Garcia v. State, 591 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)