MICHAEL MARRO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2002-01-09
No. 4D01-320
POLEN, C.J., and KLEIN, J., concur.
803 So. 2d 906 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 21 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Marro was convicted of aggravated battery and sentenced to prison with restitution ordered. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but reversed and remanded the restitution order, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter restitution after Marro filed his notice of appeal.


Holding

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order after the notice of appeal was filed. Although the trial court had reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution at sentencing, this reservation did not preserve jurisdiction to conduct a restitution hearing and enter an order after the appeal was initiated.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court is divested of jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed.

[2] A trial court may reimpose restitution on remand after a new hearing to determine the amount, even if jurisdiction was initially reserved for that purpose.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed.”

Establishes the core legal principle that jurisdiction is divested once an appeal is initiated, even if jurisdiction was reserved to determine restitution amount.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Marro was found guilty of aggravated battery following a jury trial. On January 23, 2001, he was sentenced to six years in prison followed by nine yea…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SHAHOOD, J.

SHAHOOD, J.

Appellant, Michael Marro, appeals his conviction and sentence on the charge of aggravated battery. We affirm appellant’s conviction. However, we hold that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution after appellant’s notice of appeal had been filed. Thus, we reverse and remand.

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated battery as charged in the information following a jury trial. On January 23, 2001, appellant was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by nine years probation with restitution ordered as a special condition of probation with the amount reserved so the state could get the accurate figures for restitution. Prior to the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel notified the court that he had an original notice of appeal which was going to be filed at the conclusion of the hearing, and which was in fact filed at that time.

On February 27, 2001, the court ordered appellant to pay restitution to the Office of the State Attorney the amount of $337.50, to the victim the amount of $190.00, and to the Office of the Attorney General the amount of $15,000.00.

On appeal, appellant claims that the court erred in entering restitution on February 27, 2001, on the grounds that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter such order after appellant had filed his notice of appeal. We agree.

In K.D. v. State, 779 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), a child was adjudicated delinquent and he filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 1999. Although divested of jurisdiction, the juvenile court entered an order of restitution on August 6, 1999, which was rendered on November 23, 1999. In re versing and remanding, the second district held:

A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed. See Edwards v. State, 734 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Colson v. State, 711 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Therefore, we strike the order of restitution. However, because the trial court reserved jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing, restitution may be reimposed on remand. See Marinelli v. State, 706 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

Id. at 468.

In Craig v. State, 766 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), this court reversed a restitution order because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a restitution hearing and enter an order setting the amount of restitution after the notice of appeal had been filed. However, on remand, the trial court may impose restitution after a new hearing to determine the same. See id.; see also Kern v. State, 726 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(trial court did not have jurisdiction to conduct restitution hearing or to enter restitution order after appellant filed his notice of appeal, even though trial court previously ordered restitution and properly reserved jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing).

While the state does not concede error, it acknowledges that pursuant to K.D. and Craig, “the trial court in the instant case may have indeed lost jurisdiction to impose restitution after appellant filed his notice of appeal,” despite the fact jurisdiction was reserved to determine the amount.

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the restitution order. On remand, the trial court may impose restitution following a new hearing to determine the amount.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

POLEN, C.J., and KLEIN, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Awilda Rodriguez v. State, 964 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …deputy’s insurer’s claim. As Mrs. Rodriguez maintained, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to enter the restitution order when she filed her notice of appeal. See Fuller v. State, 786 So. 2d 1269, 1269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Accordingly, we reverse the order. Generally, when we strike an order of restitution the trial court may hold a new hearing on remand to determine the proper amount of restitution and enter a new order. See Fuller, 786 So.…
  • A.B. v. State, 910 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …1152 (Fla.1979). In the case sub judice, the record on appeal is sufficient for review. As a result of A.B. filing the notice of appeal before the restitution hearing was held, the trial court no longer retained jurisdiction. E.g., Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[T]he trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution after appellant’s notice of appeal had been filed.”). Accordingly, the restitution hearing and the resulting order became a nullity. Procedurally…
  • Kosa v. State, 923 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …appeal. Gonzalez v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In Marro v. State, this court held that: “A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been filed.” 803 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s March 23rd order. However, because the trial court reserved jurisdiction to hold a hearing to determine the amount of restitution, we remand to [*1286] the trial court to allow it to…

Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw