STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
TERRELL CHAPMAN, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's downward departure sentence for Chapman's fourth or subsequent DUI conviction. The appellate court reversed, holding that none of the four reasons offered by the trial court—Chapman's impaired capacity, need to support a child, lack of arrests since 1994, and absence of injury or property damage—were legally valid bases for departing below the sentencing guidelines.
None of the four reasons offered by the trial court constituted valid grounds for a downward departure. The court erred in each instance: intoxication cannot support departure; family support obligations have been rejected as a valid reason; prior arrest history and absence of injury are already considered in the guidelines; and the absence of property damage is not a valid departure reason because DUI with property damage constitutes a separate crime.
[1] A trial court may not base a downward departure sentence on a defendant's intoxication at the time of the offense.
[2] A defendant's need to support a child does not outweigh the need for prison as a basis for downward departure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court may not base a downward departure on the defendant's "intoxication at the time of the offense."”
Establishes that statutory law prohibits using intoxication as a basis for downward departure, making the trial court's first reason for departure impermissible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTerrell Chapman pleaded guilty to a charge of fourth or subsequent violation of driving while under the influence (DUI). The trial court sentenced Cha…
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PARKER, Acting Chief Judge.
The State seeks review of the downward departure sentence entered after Terrell Chapman entered a plea to the charge of fourth or subsequent violation of driving while under the influence (DUI).1 The State asserts that none of the four reasons offered by the court support a downward departure. We agree and reverse.
In sentencing Chapman below the guidelines, the trial court offered four reasons to support the downward departure: (1) capacity to appreciate the criminal nature and substantially impaired conduct; (2) need to support child outweighs the need for prison; (3) no prior arrests since 1994; and (4) no personal injury or property damage as a result of the incident. As to the first reason, the court may not base a downward departure on the defendant’s “intoxication at the time of the offense.” § 921.0016(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, the court erred in departing downward based on its finding that Chapman lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of the offense and that his conduct was substantially impaired. The trial court’s second reason for the down ward departure, that Chapman’s need to support his child outweighs his need for prison, has been rejected by this court as well. See Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); State v. Bray, 738 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
The fact that Chapman has had no arrests since 1994, the trial court’s third reason for departing downward, is not a valid reason for departure because it is considered when scoring the sentencing guidelines. State v. Sachs, 526 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla.1988); State v. Green, 511 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Similarly, the fact that the DUI did not result in any personal injury does not support a downward departure because personal injury is taken into account by the guidelines. See Sachs, 526 So. 2d at 50; see also § 921.0024, Fla. Stat. (1999) (showing victim injury as a consideration under the guidelines scoresheet).
The trial court’s final reason for departure, that the DUI did not involve property damage, is not a valid reason for departure because a DUI with property damage is a separate crime under section 316.193(3), Florida Statutes (1999). Cf. Atwaters v. State, 519 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties), and State v. Lisk, 523 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that the trial court may not depart downward based on the quantity of money stolen in a theft case based on the reasoning in Atwaters).
Reversed.
CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ„ Concur. . § 316.193(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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LEE v. State, 223 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…d for his offense.”). Finally, the court relied on Lee’s lack of criminal history. This is not a valid reason for departing because a defendant’s criminal history is considered when calculating his minimum permissible sentence. See State v. Chapman, 805 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); State v. Scaife, 676 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Thus, none of the non-statutory mitigators were permissible considerations in accordance with legislative sentencing policies. As neither the statutory mitigator no…
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State v. Stephenson, 973 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…need to support his elderly mother, among other things, was not sufficient reason for downward departure). Likewise, the courts have held that a defendant’s need to support his child is an invalid reason for downward departure. See State v. Chapman, 805 So. 2d 906, 907-OS (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that fact that defendant’s need to support his child outweighs his need for prison has been rejected as reason for downward departure); State v. Bray, 738 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (concluding that defend…
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State v. Walker, 923 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…ative sentence”); State v. Warren, 629 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (listing the fact that the defendant had an elderly mother who needed his support as one of several insufficient reasons for downward departure); see also State v. Chapman, 805 So. 2d 906, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (noting the court had previously rejected the defendant’s need to support his child as a reason for a downward departure). Because the only reason set forth by the trial court in support of its decision to downward depart…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Atwaters v. State, 519 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Sachs, 526 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1988)
- Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- State v. Bray, 738 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- State v. Lisk, 523 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Ernsberger v. State, 511 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- State v. Green, 511 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)