EDUARDO PUNTA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2002-01-23
No. 3D01-3012
Before JORGENSON, GODERICH, and FLETCHER, JJ.
806 So. 2d 569 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Eduardo Punta appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his original community control and probation sentence was void because it violated statutory restrictions on community control for repeat forcible felony offenders. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Punta was estopped from challenging the plea agreement after accepting its benefits and later violating its terms.


Holding

The original community control sentence, though potentially prohibited by statute, cannot be challenged by Punta because he accepted the benefits of the plea agreement and is therefore estopped from later claiming the agreement was illegal. The motion is barred as successive and the 30-year sentence stands.


Headnotes

[1] A claim previously raised and denied in a prior post-conviction motion is barred as successive.

[2] A defendant who voluntarily and intelligently accepts the terms of a plea agreement, receives its benefits, and then violates its conditions may be estopped from challeng…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“an offender may not be placed in community control if (a) Convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and (b) Previously convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08.”

The statutory provision Punta relied upon to argue his original sentence was illegal

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Punta pleaded guilty to robbery and burglary in 1990 pursuant to a written plea agreement providing for two years of community control followed by sev…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
FLETCHER, Judge.

FLETCHER, Judge.

Eduardo Punta appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.800 motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.

Punta was charged with robbery and burglary. In 1990, he entered a plea of guilty to both counts pursuant to a written plea agreement. The written plea agreement called for two years of community control followed by seven years of probation. Punta was told that, given his prior criminal history, if he violated the agreement he could face up to 30 years as an habitual violent felony offender. In 1992, Punta violated the agreement and was sentenced to 30 years in state prison. He filed a 3.850 post-conviction motion which was denied. There is no record of his appealing that decision.

Punta here claims that his sentence of community control followed by probation was illegal because it was prohibited by section 948.01(12), Florida Statutes (1989), which provided that “an offender may not be placed in community control if (a) Convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08, and (b) Previously convicted of or adjudication withheld for a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08.” Punta’s convictions qualified as forcible felonies under that statute. Punta argues that because his initial community control sentence was void, any violation of that community control/probation is also void, and it follows that his 30-year sentence for violation of probation must be vacated.

This very issue was raised and denied in Punta’s first post-conviction motion. It is therefore barred as successive. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(f) (2001). Further, “Florida courts have repeatedly held that sentences imposed in violation of statutory requirements, which are to the benefit of the defendant and to which he agreed, may not be challenged after the defendant has accepted the benefits flowing from the plea, but has failed to carry out the conditions imposed on him.” Bashlor v. State, 586 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Clark v. State, 651 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(after defendant accepted plea offer and the state and court fulfilled their part of the bargain, the defendant cannot be relieved of the burden of his contract upon later finding that the plea was unauthorized by law); Smith v. State, 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)(defendant es-topped from challenging plea-bargained sentence after having accepted the benefits of it). The record before us shows that Punta voluntarily and intelligently accepted the terms of the plea agreement, the terms of which were • far less restrictive than a 30-year prison sentence. He began to serve his term pursuant to the plea agreement and then violated the agreement’s terms. Having accepted the benefits of the agreement Punta cannot now claim that the agreement was illegal.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw