GUILLERMO GONZALEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Guillermo Gonzalez appealed his classification as a sexual predator, challenging the application of the 1997 Sexual Predator Act's public notification requirements rather than the 1995 version's less expansive notice provisions. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the notification requirements are regulatory, not punitive, and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clause.
The court held that the notification requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are regulatory and procedural in nature, not punitive, and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clause when applied retrospectively.
[1] The application of a later version of the Sexual Predator Act to a defendant, even if the underlying offenses occurred before the later version's enactment, does not viol…
[2] Regulatory statutes, including reporting and notification requirements under the Sexual Predator Act, do not constitute punishment for ex post facto clause analysis.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating ex post facto challenges
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGonzalez was charged with kidnaping and six counts of sexual battery occurring in August 1995. He was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement on August…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Regulatory Statutes cases and more on FLexlaw
NESBITT, Senior Judge.
Defendant Guillermo Gonzalez appeals the public notification requirement of his classification as a sexual predator. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with one count of kidnaping and six counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon or force. The information alleged that the foregoing offenses occurred on or between August 3rd and 4th, 1995.
On August 28, 1997, defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, and on February 12, 1998, the trial court declared defendant a sexual predator.1 The trial court applied the 1997 version of the Sexual Predator Act.
Defendant argues that the 1995 version of the Act should have been used. He claims that the application of the notice provisions of the 1997 Act unjustly subjected him to a more wide spread dissemination of his designation as a sexual predator, and as such amounted to an ex post facto violation.2 We disagree. “In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Simmons v. State 753 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), citing Arnold v. State, 755 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Regulatory statutes do not constitute punishment. See Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
The reporting requirements as well as the notification requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause. See Rickman v. State, 714 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Oce v. State, 742 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Deatley v. State, 722 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.
. Although the defendant clearly states that he is objecting solely to the public notification portion of his classification as a sexual predator, he argues generally that the trial court was without authority to designate him a sexual predator because the determination was not made contemporaneous to his initial sentencing. We find this claim unmeritorious. As stated in Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the sexual predator designation is not an impermissible modification of an offender’s sentence "because the designation 'sexual predator’ is neither a sentence nor a punishment.” See Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
. The 1995 version of the act required the sheriff or chief of police to notify the public of the sexual predator's presence by publishing a notice in a newspaper for several consecutive weeks. See § 775.225(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). The level of dissemination under the 1997 statute included notification statewide, as well as placement on the Internet. See § 775.21(7), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Therrien v. State, 859 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). Florida courts considering the issue had all seemingly concluded that sexual predator "designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment.” Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135, 138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). See Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (rejecting appellant's argument that the Florida Sexual Predators Act imposes punishment ex post facto); Rickman v. State, 714 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (same); Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000, 1009-11 (Fla. 2d DC…
-
Cabrera v. State, 884 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…nt or qualifying offense. Moreover, the courts have specifically held that failure to designate a qualified individual at sentencing for a current offense is not jurisdictional, and it may be done after sentencing has occurred. In Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the court noted: Although the defendant clearly states that he is objecting solely to the public notification portion of his classification as a sexual predator, he argues general [*488] ly that the trial court was without autho…
-
Boyer v. State, 946 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…because the alleged error involves Appellant’s designation as a sexual predator. A sexual predator designation is neither a punishment nor a sentence and does not render a sentence illegal as the term is used-in rule 3.800(a). See Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Walker v. State, 718 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Freeland v. State, 832 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the registration and…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Collie v. State, 710 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Simmons v. State, 753 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Houston v. State, 714 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Bertram OCE v. State, 742 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Manzell Arnold v. State, 755 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Huey v. State, 722 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)