STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JORGE CHAVES-MENDEZ, APPELLEE
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The State appealed sentences imposed on a defendant who pleaded nolo contendere to capital sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation charges after the trial court sua sponte initiated plea negotiations. The court reversed, holding that trial courts lack authority to initiate plea discussions and may only participate in them at the discretion of the parties.
A trial court lacks authority to initiate plea negotiations; it may only participate in plea discussions at the discretion of the parties upon their request. The trial court's sua sponte initiation of plea negotiations constitutes per se reversible error, and the resulting sentences must be reversed and remanded.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error when it sua sponte initiates plea negotiations with a defendant.
[2] A trial court may participate in plea discussions upon the request of a party, but is not required to do so.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court must not initiate a plea dialogue; rather, at its discretion, it may (but is not required to) participate in such discussions upon request of a party.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that trial courts are prohibited from initiating plea negotiations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was charged with capital sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age and lewd and lascivious molestation. When the case was cal…
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PALMER, J.
The State appeals the sentences imposed by the trial court on Jorge Chaves Mendez (“defendant”)
. We reverse.
The defendant was charged by two count information with committing the crimes of capital sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age, and lewd and lascivious molestation.2 When the case was called for trial, the trial court sua sponte initiated plea negotiations with the defendant. This negotiation contemplated that, in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to enter a plea of nolo conten-dere to both charges, the trial court would impose a sentence of probation. Over the objection of the State and the victim’s family, the defendant accepted the trial court’s plea offer. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment on the defendant’s plea and sentenced him accordingly. The State appeals arguing that the defendant’s sentences are illegal because the trial court lacked the authority to initiate plea negotiations with the defendant. We agree.
The trial court’s initiation of plea negotiations with the defendant was per se reversible error. As the Supreme Court cautioned in State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 513 (Fla.2000), “the trial court must not initiate a plea dialogue; rather, at its discretion, it may (but is not required to) participate in such discussions upon request of a party.”
Here, since the trial court sua sponte initiated plea negotiations with the defendant, we must reverse the defendant’s sen tences and remand this case to the trial court. Upon remand, defendant may withdraw his plea. See State v. Ellis, 715 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea upon reversal of his sentence imposed on a plea agreement).3
Sentence REVERSED and case REMANDED.
THOMPSON, C.J., concurs.
SAWAYA, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(l)(J)(authorizing the State to appeal an order imposing an unlawful or illegal sentence, or imposing a sentence outside the range permitted by sentencing guidelines).
. §§ 794.011(2); 800.04(5), Fla. Stat. (2001).
. Upon remand, we direct the court’s attention to the fact that the only sentence that can be imposed for a conviction on capital sexual battery is life imprisonment with a minimum mandatory of twenty five years. See Wilson v. State, 630 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
SAWAYA, J.,
concurring and concurring specially.
I fully concur in the majority opinion and write only to express an additional ground that I rely on for reversal.
The scoresheet prepared for count II, lewd and lascivious assault, calculated a minimum sentence of seventy-eight months’ incarceration.1 The only reason pronounced by the trial judge for imposition of the downward departure sentence of probation was a “legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain.” However, the State was not a party to any “plea bargain” and the law is clear that a plea agreement to which the State is not a party is not a valid reason for imposition of a sentence that constitutes a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Sawyer, 753 So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Finally, although an uncoerced plea bargain is a valid reason to depart from the guidelines, the downward departure in this case cannot be upheld on this basis because the State did not join in the plea agreement.”) (citing State v. Laperreri, 710 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Bowland, 604 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)); see also State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“[A] plea bargain contemplates an ‘agreement’ between the state and the defendant which is approved by the court. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.171. Here, the plea was not entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to depart from the guidelines on this basis.”).
. Obviously, as the majority opinion points out, the minimum sentence for the offense of capital sex battery is life and is not subject to the guidelines. Therefore, this offense was not included in the scoresheet.
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Delemos v. State, 969 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…courts to use the term "illegal” to justify the state's appeal of a sentence under rule 9.140(c)(1)(M), perhaps without taking the time to distinguish between what is unlawful in a sentence versus what is illegal. See, e.g., State v. Chaves-Mendez, 809 So. 2d 910, 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding sentence was “illegal" and subject to State appeal because the trial court initiated the plea negotiations that the sentence resulted from). . We note that in the few cases discussing the possible increase of a sen…
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State v. McMAHON, 94 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 2012)…on of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. McMahon, 47 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Chaves-Mendez, 809 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The conflict issue concerns whether the State is authorized under section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), to appeal a sentence that is otherwise leg…1 / 2
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Rogers v. State, 844 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…9 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 796 So. 2d 538 (Fla.2001); McGlynn v. State, 697 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). . State v. Franklin, 618 So. 2d 171 (Fla.1993). . State v. Merricks, 831 So. 2d 156 (Fla.2002). . State v. Chaves-Mendez, 809 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). . Wofford v. State, 819 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). . Gilliam v. State, 514 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla.1987); Austing v. State, 804 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Arnold v. State, 755 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). . Willia…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- State v. Sawyer, 753 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- State v. Bowland, 604 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- State v. Laperreri, 710 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Darrel Wilson v. State, 630 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- State v. Kilya Ellis, 715 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)