KALISHEA REED, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kalishea Reed appealed the trial court's denial of her motion for additional jail credit under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order but on different grounds, finding the motion facially insufficient while suggesting the trial court's attachments would have been inadequate to support its ruling.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of Reed's motion because it was facially insufficient under Gilbert v. State, as it did not allege that court records demonstrated her entitlement to additional jail credit. However, the court noted that had the motion been facially sufficient, reversal would have been required because the trial court's attachments did not adequately refute Reed's claim without a signed plea agreement or plea colloquy transcript.
[1] A motion for jail credit pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is facially insufficient if it does not allege that court records reflect the defendant's…
[2] A trial court's order denying a motion for jail credit, which relies solely on a judgment and sentence stating "Stipulated Credit," is insufficient to refute a defendant'…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a rule 3.800(a) motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendant's entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient”
Establishes the legal standard for facial sufficiency of jail credit motions under the cited rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReed was incarcerated in Hillsborough County Jail from November 4, 1999, to October 16, 2000, totaling 357 days. The trial court awarded her only 251 …
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PARKER, Judge.
Kalishea Reed appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for jail credit filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
We affirm, although not for the reasons cited by the trial court. Reed’s motion alleged that she was incarcerated in the Hillsborough County Jail from November 4, 1999, to October 16, 2000, and that she was therefore entitled to 357 days’ jail credit toward her prison sentence. Reed’s motion alleged that the trial court awarded her only 251 days’ jail credit rather than the full 357 days. Reed’s motion did not allege that the court records reflect that she is entitled to the jail credit she is seeking, and she did not attach any jail or court records reflecting that she served the claimed amount of time in jail.
The trial court denied Reed’s motion, asserting that Reed had executed a plea agreement which stipulated to jail credit of 251 days.
However, the only attachment to the trial court’s order was a portion of the judgment and sentence which stated that Reed would be allowed a total of 251 days’ jail credit followed by the phrase, “Stipulated Credit.” Reed appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion.
We affirm the trial court’s order because Reed’s motion is facially insufficient. See Gilbert v. State, 805 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that a rule 3.800(a) motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendant’s entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient). Our affirmance on this basis is without prejudice to Reed’s right to file a facially sufficient motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a). Such motion will not be considered successive.
We note, however, that had Reed’s motion been facially sufficient, we would have been compelled to reverse the trial court’s order because the attachments to the order do not refute Reed’s claim. Without an attached signed plea agreement or the transcript of the plea colloquy showing that Reed had stipulated to the jail credit, the trial court’s order and its attachments are insufficient to refute Reed’s claim to additional jail credit. Although we do not decide the issue at this time, we also note that when a claim of this nature is raised, the court records must establish the defendant’s clear intent to waive a portion of his or her accrued jail time before we could affirm a defendant’s stipulation to credit for less jail time than was actually served. It seems to this court that a defendant should not lose credit for jail time actually served due to a mistake by the defendant, defense counsel, or the State.
Affirmed.
NORTHCUTT and STRINGER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…dit must be clear and knowing); Silverstein v. State, 654 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding waiver of jail time credit must be specific, voluntary, and clearly shown on the record). In its response, the State argues that Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), supports the trial court’s conclusion. It asserts that Reed stands for the proposition that a stipulation to a specific amount of jail credit contained within a written plea agreement is tantamount to a waiver of any amount above…
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Haines v. State, 851 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…uch a waiver, the failure to award credit results in an illegal sentence. See Beshara v. State, 736 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Such a waiver will not be presumed. See Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Wells v. State, 751 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, the trial court may either award additional jail and prison credit to which it concludes appellant is entitled, or attach…
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Murphy v. State, 930 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…also error. Further, contrary to the state’s assertion, the record of the proceedings below do not evidence a clear and knowing waiver of entitlement to additional jail credit. Haines v. State, 851 So. 2d 831, 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that the trial “court records must establish the defendant’s clear intent to waive a portion of his” accrued jail time in order to deny a facially sufficient motion for additional jail credit on the grounds of a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gilbert v. State, 805 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)