DWAYNE K. DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dwayne Davis challenged a trial court's denial of his motion for additional jail time credit, claiming the court improperly found he had waived entitlement to credit beyond what was stipulated in his plea agreement. The appellate court reversed, holding that a mere stipulation to a specific jail credit amount does not conclusively establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of additional earned credit.
A stipulation to a specific amount of jail credit in a plea agreement does not, by itself, conclusively establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of additional jail credit. The court records must affirmatively establish the defendant's clear intent to waive a portion of accrued jail time before a court can deny a motion for additional jail credit.
[1] A written plea agreement stating a specific amount of jail credit is not conclusive evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of additional jail credit.
[2] A waiver of jail credit must be clear, knowing, and voluntary, and specifically shown on the record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We do not view this statement in the plea agreement as conclusive evidence that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled.”
Establishes that mere specification of jail credit in a plea agreement does not establish knowing and voluntary waiver
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis entered into a written plea agreement that specified credit for time served as of July 31, 2006, as 1,531 days. The trial court denied Davis's m…
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TORPY, J.
In this postconviction proceeding, Appellant challenges the lower court’s order summarily denying his motion for additional credit for time served in jail prior to his sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion finding that he had waived entitlement to additional jail credit. The trial court attached the written plea agreement in support of this finding. The written plea agreement states “[cjredit for time served as of 7/31/2006 is 1,531 days.” We do not view this statement in the plea agreement as conclusive evidence that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled. See Murphy v. State, 930 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (finding waiver of jail credit must be clear and knowing); Silverstein v. State, 654 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding waiver of jail time credit must be specific, voluntary, and clearly shown on the record).
In its response, the State argues that Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), supports the trial court’s conclusion. It asserts that Reed stands for the proposition that a stipulation to a specific amount of jail credit contained within a written plea agreement is tantamount to a waiver of any amount above the stipulated sum. We disagree. Reed affirmed the trial court because the motion for jail credit was not sufficient in that it failed to allege the entitlement to the credit was shown in court records. It did so without prejudice to the filing of a legally sufficient motion. In dicta the Second District Court stated:
We note, however, that had Reed’s motion been facially sufficient, we would have been compelled to reverse the trial court’s order because the attachments to the order do not refute Reed’s claim. Without an attached signed plea agreement or the transcript of the plea colloquy showing that Reed had stipulated to the jail credit, the trial court’s order and its attachments are insufficient to refute Reed’s claim to additional jail credit.
Although we do not decide the issue at this time, we also note that when a claim of this nature is raised, the court records must establish the defendant’s clear intent to waive a portion of his or her accrued jail time before we could affirm a defendant’s stipulation to credit for less jail time than was actually served. It seems to this court that a defendant should not lose credit for jail time actually served due to a mistake by the defendant, defense counsel, or the State. Reed, 810 So. 2d at 1026-27 (emphasis supplied).
We do not interpret this dicta to mean that a waiver can be shown merely by a defendant’s stipulation to a certain amount of credit, absent evidence that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional jail credit and voluntarily relinquished that right. In fact, the emphasized portion of the quotation is to the contrary.
Therefore, we reverse the order and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it either grant the motion or attach portions of the record that conclusively refute Appellant’s claim.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011)…period constituted waivers of any additional credit for time served. Johnson and Joyner correctly contend that the Third District’s decisions expressly and directly conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), which held that a plea agreement provision regarding credit for time served could be challenged under rule 3.800(a). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [*1048] For the reasons we explain, we approve the dec…
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Johnson v. State, 974 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…edit for time served from a specific date effectively waives any claim to credit for time served before that date. See also Rivera v. State, 954 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), review granted, 968 So. 2d 557 (Fla.2007). Contra, e.g., Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); but cf. Fulcher v. State, 875 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. [*1153] 3d DCA 2004) (Cope & Wells, JJ., specially concurring), case dismissed, 890 So. 2d 1114 (Fla.2004); Ryan v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Sommers v. State,…
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Delmar Velasquez v. State, 11 So. 3d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…tten notation in the plea agreement as to the amount of credit a defendant will receive is not sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waived jail credit to which he would otherwise be legally entitled.” Davis v. State, 968 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). A stipulation to a specific amount of credit in a written plea agreement is not sufficient in the absence of eviderice “that the defendant knew of his entitlement to additional credit and voluntarily relinquished that righ…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Silverstein v. State, 654 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Kalishea Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Murphy v. State, 930 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)