BARRY FRANKLIN, PETITIONER,
v.
KATHLEEN KEARNEY, AS SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, AND DENNY GIES, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NORTH FLORIDA EVALUATION AND TREATMENT CENTER, AND THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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The circuit court that committed Petitioner has jurisdiction to hear his habeas corpus petition challenging the commitment, even if he is detained elsewhere.
[1] Mandamus is a proper remedy to review a lower tribunal's determination that it lacks jurisdiction.
[2] A circuit court that commits a defendant to a mental health treatment facility has jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of that com…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner was charged with a felony, found incompetent, and involuntarily committed by the Broward County circuit court. He filed a habeas corpus pet…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner seeks mandamus relief from an amended order of the Broward County circuit court, transferring his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Alachua County circuit court. We grant the petition, quash the order, and direct the Bro-ward County circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over the habeas petition.
The Broward circuit court’s transfer was based on its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner is being detained in Alachua County. Mandamus is properly used to test the correct ness of a lower tribunal’s determination that it lacks jurisdiction. See Pino v. Dist. Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla.1992).
Petitioner was charged with a felony in the Broward County circuit court. That court adjudicated him incompetent to proceed and involuntarily committed him under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2001), to the Department of Children and Family Services to be placed in a mental health treatment facility. Petitioner challenged the legality of his involuntary commitment by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Broward circuit court under section 916.107(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
A prior version of section 916.107(9)(a) has been interpreted to require that such a challenge be made by habeas petition filed in the circuit court in the county where the defendant is being detained. See, e.g., Gentzen v. State, 689 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); McLelland v. State, 368 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
However, the statute was amended in 1998 to provide that the committing court be requested to issue the writ of release. See Ch. 98-92, § 7, at 712, Laws of Fla. It was the Broward County circuit court that adjudged Petitioner incompetent to proceed in his criminal case and involuntarily committed him. Under the current version of the statute, as the state properly concedes, the circuit court in Broward County has jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petition filed below. We therefore grant the instant petition for mandamus and direct that court to exercise its jurisdiction.
WARNER, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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Errol Lewis v. James, 88 So. 3d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Franklin v. Kearney, 814 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (only the committing court has jurisdiction to entertain habeas petition challenging legality of involuntary commitment). Mr. Lewis does not adequately present any of his “bill of rights” claims in [*382] his initial brief.…
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Matamoros v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…he alternative, a writ of certiorari to quash the successor trial judge’s April 6, 2015 order. II. Analysis We begin our analysis by noting that mandamus is appropriate to compel the circuit court to exercise its jurisdiction. Franklin v. Kearney, 814 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The issue before us is whether Matamo-ros’s June 25, 2013 motion for rehearing— directed toward the trial court’s June 20, 2013 order — was an authorized motion for rehearing…
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Shird T. Myrick v. Inch, 303 So. 3d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…DCA 2012) (reviewing transfer order as a nonfinal, appealable order concerning venue); Jean-Simon v. State, 5 So. 3d 682, 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (reviewing transfer order through a petition for writ of habeas - 3 - corpus); Franklin v. Kearney, 814 So. 2d 462, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reviewing transfer order through a petition for writ of mandamus). We think the Third District's conclusion—that such rulings can be reviewed as nonfinal, appealable venue orders under rule 9.130(a)(3)(A)—is both congru…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Elio Pino v. Dist. Court OF Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1992)
- Gentzen v. State, 689 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- McLELLAND v. State, 368 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)