CLYDE HINES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Clyde Hines was convicted of felony battery after a fight with his girlfriend. While affirming the conviction, the appellate court reversed the sentence because the trial court mistakenly believed it lacked authority to impose a downward departure sentence based on the victim's conduct as an aggressor, despite the jury's rejection of Hines's self-defense claim.
A trial court may impose a downward departure sentence based on the victim's conduct as an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker even if that conduct is legally insufficient to excuse the defendant's actions or if the jury rejected a self-defense defense. The trial court may consider such facts in mitigation so long as it does not make factual findings that conflict with the jury's verdict.
[1] A trial court may depart downward from sentencing guidelines based on victim conduct, even if that conduct was insufficient to excuse the defendant's actions.
[2] A jury's rejection of a self-defense claim does not preclude a trial court from considering the victim's conduct as a basis for a downward departure sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Conduct that is legally insufficient to excuse the defendant's actions may nevertheless be legally sufficient to warrant a downward departure sentence.”
Establishes the core legal principle that victim conduct can support mitigation even if insufficient as a legal defense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClyde Hines got into a fight with his girlfriend Linda Jackson. Hines claimed he acted in self-defense because Jackson approached him with a butcher k…
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PARKER, Judge.
Clyde Hines appeals his conviction and sentence for felony battery. We affirm Hines’s conviction without further comment. However, because the trial court misconstrued its authority to consider a downward departure sentence, we reverse Hines’s sentence and remand for reconsideration.
This case arose out of a fight between Hines and his girlfriend, Linda Jackson. At trial, Hines contended that he had acted in self-defense when he hit Jackson because she had been approaching him with a butcher knife in her hand. In convicting Hines, the jury rejected his claim of self-defense.
At sentencing, Hines sought a downward departure sentence based on Jackson’s conduct as an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident. See § 921.0016(4)(f), Fla. Stat. (2000) (allowing the trial court to depart downward if the victim is an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident in question). The trial court apparently believed that it was not allowed to consider the evidence of Jackson’s conduct because the jury had rejected Hines’s self-defense argument. On the record, the trial court stated:
The only possible reason for departure would be that the victim was the initiator. But, you know, the jury rejected that in rejecting the, in essence rejected that in rejecting the self-defense theory.
The State’s requesting 60 months, and in terms of mitigation, I’m going to sentence him to the bottom of the guidelines because of all of the factors in mitigation, but I don’t think that legally, based on the facts of this case, that I can depart below the guidelines.
The court then sentenced Hines to 42.9 months in prison, the lowest possible guidelines sentence.
Conduct that is legally insufficient to excuse the defendant’s actions may nevertheless be legally sufficient to warrant a downward departure sentence. See, e.g., State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 296 (Fla. 2001) (allowing the trial court to impose a downward departure sentence in a statutory rape case based on the victim as a willing participant despite the fact that consent is not a legal defense to the crime); State v. Tai Van Le, 553 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (affirming a downward departure sentence in a murder case based on the victim as the aggressor despite the fact that the jury apparently rejected the defendant’s claim of self-defense); State v. Mathis, 541 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (affirming a downward departure sentence in an aggravated battery case because the victim provoked the defendant). While a trial court may not make factual findings at sentencing that conflict with the jury’s verdict, the trial court may consider facts in imposing a sentence that would not be sufficient to negate or excuse the crime. Rife, 789 So. 2d at 293.
Here, the trial court’s statements make it clear that the trial court believed that it could not depart downward based on the jury’s interpretation of Jackson’s conduct. However, because the trial court can mitigate a sentence based on conduct that is not sufficient to excuse the crime, the trial court sentenced Hines under a misconception about its discretion in sentencing. It is not clear from the record whether the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had understood that it had the discretion to depart. Therefore, we reverse Hines’s sentence and remand for the trial court to reconsid er the sentence in light of its discretion to depart if the facts so warrant.
Conviction affirmed; sentence reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
CASANUEYA and STRINGER, JJ„ Concur.
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Cited By (15 total)
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Kezal v. State, 42 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ourt would have imposed the same sentence if it had understood its discretion, then the sentence imposed must be vacated and the case remanded for resentenc-ing. See Torres v. State, 17 So. 3d 1282, 1282-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Hines v. State, 817 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). Here, Ms. Kezal argues that the circuit court mistakenly determined that it did not have the discretion to impose a departure sentence under subsections (2)(c) and (2)(j) because Ms. Kezal’s offenses involved driving under…1 / 2
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Kemar Rochester v. State, 95 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…2 So. 2d 395, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (addressing appellant’s claim that the trial court erred when it expressed the belief that it could not consider any factors not enumerated in section 921.0026 for a downward departure sentence); Hines v. State, 817 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (discussing a similar issue as the one raised on this appeal as to whether the trial court misconstrued its authority to consider a downward departure sentence). Turning to the merits of the issue, Rochester argues that the…
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McCORVEY v. State, 872 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…whether the non-statutory reasons proffered by the appellant would have been sufficient to support a downward departure. Nonetheless, the trial court sentenced the appellant “under a misconception about its discretion in sentencing.” Hines v. State, 817 So. 2d 964, 965-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Because we are unable to determine from this record whether the trial court would have imposed a downward departure if it understood that it was allowed to consider non-statutory factors, we reverse the appellant’s senten…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2001)
- State v. TAI VAN LE, 553 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- State v. Torrance Mathis, 541 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)