VALERIE BOGOS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JAMES E. BOGOS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this family law appeal, the former wife challenges a trial court order that terminated her rehabilitative alimony and partially denied her request for attorneys' fees. The appellate court reverses the attorneys' fees portion due to lack of specific findings and remands, while affirming all other aspects of the order.
The appellate court reversed the attorneys' fees portion of the order because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the reasonable hourly rate, hours expended, or the basis for reducing the fees from what it had found to be reasonable. The court affirmed all other aspects of the order terminating the rehabilitative alimony.
[1] An order awarding attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding is not a final, appealable order if the trial court intends to issue a subsequent written order incorporatin…
[2] A trial court must make specific factual findings regarding the number of hours reasonably expended and the reasonable hourly rate to substantiate an attorney's fee award…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The lack of findings makes the order facially insufficient and prohibits meaningful review.”
Establishes the standard for requiring specific findings in attorneys' fees awards to permit appellate review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter the trial court held a final hearing on the former husband's petition to terminate rehabilitative alimony, it addressed requests by both parties…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Valerie Bogos, the former wife, appeals an order terminating the last six months of her rehabilitative alimony award and denying, in part, her request for attorneys’ fees. James E. Bogos, the former husband, cross-appeals the same order raising various other issues.
We reverse that portion of the order which granted only part of the former wife’s request for attorneys’ fees because the order lacks specific findings to support it.
We affirm without further comment all other aspects of the order. After a final hearing on the former husband’s petition to terminate rehabilitative alimony, the trial court held a hearing on numerous pending motions and other outstanding issues. These issues included requests by both parties for attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating the petition to terminate alimony and in resolving other motions pertaining to child visitation and shared parental responsibility. At that hearing, it was uncontroverted that the former husband earns, and has consistently earned, more than four times the income of the former wife.
Toward the end of the hearing as the trial court attempted to rule on the matters before it, the parties repeatedly interjected new arguments and issues, making the trial court’s task difficult and the hearing transcript confusing.1 At one point, the trial court held that the former wife had incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees of $16,500.
The trial court later indicated that the former wife was requesting $14,335 in attorneys’ fees. Despite these findings, at the conclusion of the hearing the trial court ordered the former husband to pay only $9,165 in fees.
The trial court did not specifically determine the reasonable hourly rate or how many hours were reasonably expended, and did not explain why it was ordering the former husband to pay only a portion of the former wife’s fees. Similarly, the, written final order does not contain findings in this regard.
On appeal, the former wife argues that the trial court properly found all of the fees to be reasonable but erroneously denied her request to award her all of the fees incurred, particularly given the substantial disparity between the parties’ incomes. See Lowman v. Lowman, 724 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The former husband argues that the trial court found some of the fees were not reasonable and properly denied them based upon factors set out in Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1997).
There are no specific findings in our record to support either of these theories, and thus we are unable to adequately review the award. The lack of findings makes the order facially insufficient and prohibits meaningful review. See Boyle v. Boyle, 485 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (citing Florida Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985)). Accordingly, we reverse the order as it relates to attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
STRINGER, J., and SCHEB, JOHN M., Senior Judge, Concur. . This case displays symptoms of the onset of Wrona's disease. See Wrona v. Wrona, 592 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). This divorced family includes two young children who will need the financial and emotional resources of both of their parents to succeed. Hopefully, on remand, the parties will find a cure for these symptoms and will resolve the remaining issues civilly and without undue expense.
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Moore v. Kelso-Moore, 152 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…conflict with the trial court’s other findings. Consequently, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make sufficient findings on reasonable hours and hourly rates, without which we cannot conduct a meaningful review. See, e.g., Bogos v. Bogos, 821 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The husband also contends that there was no evidence to support the reasonableness of the hourly rate of the associate and paralegal who worked on the file. However, section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes, expressly does not require…
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Tullos v. Tullos, 37 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ting that number of hours seemed inflated but omitting required findings as to reasonable rate and hours expended); Thurner, 584 So. 2d at 152. The husband concedes that the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings. In Bogos v. Bogos, 821 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (Bogos I), we reversed an attorney’s fee award because the trial court failed to make findings explaining why it reduced the fees from a stipulated amount. In a subsequent appeal after remand, we reversed again and provided e…
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Kasm v. Lynnel, 975 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…as permitted under rule 9.600(c) but also by securing entitlement to “final” appellate fees by filing a motion with the appellate court pursuant to rule 9.400(b). . Wrona v. Wrona, 592 So. 2d 694, 696-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see also Bogos v. Bogos, 821 So. 2d 383, 384 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)
- Wrona v. Wrona, 592 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Boyle v. Boyle, 485 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Lowman v. Lowman, 724 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)