SEAN MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
TERESA KELSO-MOORE, APPELLEE
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A husband appealed a trial court order awarding temporary attorney's fees to the wife in a dissolution of marriage action. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court found the wife's hours excessive but failed to specify a reasonable number of hours or hourly rates, making the fee award appear inconsistent with the court's own findings.
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees without making sufficient findings on reasonable hours and hourly rates. The court properly relied on the wife's principal attorney's testimony regarding rates without requiring expert corroboration under section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes. The case is reversed and remanded for the trial court to make adequate findings.
[1] A trial court must make sufficient findings regarding reasonable hours and hourly rates to support an award of attorney's fees.
[2] A trial court's award of attorney's fees may be reversed and remanded if the amount awarded appears inconsistent with the court's findings on the reasonableness of hours…
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Establishes the factual disparity in hours that prompted the trial court's finding of excessiveness
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage action, the wife's law firm expended 500.3 hours while the husband's firm expended 154.35 hours for substantially similar…
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A husband appeals an order granting the wife’s motion for temporary relief of an award of attorney’s fees in this dissolution of marriage action. The trial court found that the hours expended were unreasonable but failed to determine a reasonable number of hours or specify the reasonable hourly rate. Because the amount awarded appears inconsistent with the trial court’s pronouncements, we must reverse and remand for further proceedings!
Although the husband stipulated to the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged by the principal lawyer representing the wife, he contested the reasonableness of the hours billed. The court agreed with his assessment, noting that the wife’s firm had expended 500.3 hours for the about the same work that the husband’s firm had expended 154.35 hours. The wife’s law firm had used block billing, which made it impossible to determine the reasonableness of the hours expended on several matters. Moreover, the court found in its review of the wife’s attorney’s billing that the firm engaged in “excessive hand holding” for the wife. The court, however, did not make any findings as to the reasonable number of hours or reasonable hourly rates of law firm members. Instead, it ordered the husband to pay $97,538.70 in attorney’s fees to date, as well as $6,200 in temporary costs, less the $12,000 previously paid by the husband.
Try as we might, we cannot decipher these numbers to determine whether the award to the wife is an abuse of discretion, particularly given the fact that the trial court appears to have sided with the *683husband regarding the excessiveness of the hours spent by the wife’s firm in the litigation. Although in Piluso v. Piluso, 622 So.2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), we held that it is not per se reversible error when the trial court fails to make explicit findings in support of a temporary award of fees, we concluded that the record in Piluso contained sufficient evidence to support the amount of fees awarded. We cannot say the same in this case. The fees awarded appear to be the lion’s share of the hours expended, which would conflict with the trial court’s other findings. Consequently, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make sufficient findings on reasonable hours and hourly rates, without which we cannot conduct a meaningful review. See, e.g., Bogos v. Bogos, 821 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The husband also contends that there was no evidence to support the reasonableness of the hourly rate of the associate and paralegal who worked on the file. However, section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes, expressly does not require corroborating expert testimony to support an award of fees. As the wife’s principal attorney testified to the rates charged and the husband provided no contrary evidence, the trial court could rely on those rates in setting the fee.
The remaining issue the husband raises concerns the interpretation of a mediation agreement provision regarding prevailing party attorney’s fees and how it applies to the issues in this case. Resolution of this issue is premature for the purpose of awarding temporary attorney’s fees.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MAY and CONNER, JJ., concur.
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Cousins v. Duprey (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)…ided between plaintiff’s three attorneys, law clerks, paralegals, and the fee expert. The hours submitted by plaintiff’s counsel were insufficiently detailed and contained improper “block billing” and duplicative time. See Moore v. Kelso-Moore, 152 So. 3d 681, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). In fact, one attorney submitted an amended affidavit reducing excessive hours in an alleged effort to be “decent.” We conclude the hours and fee award were excessive. As Judge Carnes stated in Norelus, “[n]o one’s m…
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Jordan v. Jordan, 199 So. 3d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…dding them to the amount the former husband owed in the equitable distribution schedule was an abuse of discretion. This abuse of discretion was furthered when the trial court adopted this finding in the Amended Final Judgment. Moore v. Kelso-Moore, 152 So. 3d 681, 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). We reverse the $13,000 award of fees, but affirm the remaining attorney’s fees award. Finally, we find no merit in the other multiple issues raised concerning: child support, tutoring expenses, computation of the former hu…
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Otto Hans van Maerssen v. Gerdts, 213 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…nt, substantial evidence. See Bengisu v. Bengisu, 12 So. 3d 283, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The court does not need to make explicit findings, but there must be sufficient evidence in the record to support the amount awarded. See Moore v. Kelso-Moore, 152 So. 3d 681, 682-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Piluso v. Piluso, 622 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). We cannot determine whether the court’s award in this case of $6,500 per month in temporary support is supported by the evidence. Although the court’s order req…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crosby v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Bogos v. Bogos, 821 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)