TERRANCE WASHINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Washington filed a second Rule 3.850 motion (seeking post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel) while an appeal was pending from the denial of his first Rule 3.850 motion on different grounds. The trial court dismissed the second motion for lack of jurisdiction, and this court affirmed that dismissal, holding that a trial court cannot rule on a second post-conviction motion when an appeal is pending from an order denying an earlier motion based on different grounds.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a second Rule 3.850 motion while an appeal is pending from an order denying an earlier Rule 3.850 motion based on different grounds. The trial court's dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, allowing Washington to refile his second motion after the first appeal is resolved.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a second motion for post-conviction relief when an appeal from an order denying a prior motion for post-conviction relief, bas…
[2] An appeal of an order denying a motion for post-conviction relief prevents the trial court from ruling on a subsequent motion for post-conviction relief that raises diffe…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court has no power to rule on an issue which would interfere with the authority of the appellate court”
Establishes the fundamental principle underlying the rule that trial courts cannot rule on matters while an appeal is pending from a related order.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWashington was sentenced after entering a plea of no contest in December 2000. In February 2001, he filed a Rule 3.850 motion alleging coercion by cou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdiction Of Trial Court Pending Appeal cases and more on FLexlaw
KLEIN, J.
We grant the state’s motion for rehearing and replace our opinion filed on June 19, 2002, with the following opinion.
After a plea of no contest appellant was sentenced in December, 2000. In February, 2001, he moved under rule 3.850 to vacate his plea on grounds he was coerced by counsel and that counsel was incompetent in several ways. The trial court denied the motion and appellant appealed to this court.
While that appeal was pending appellant filed another rule 3.850 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on grounds which were different than the ineffective assistance grounds of the first motion. The trial court dismissed the second motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on that motion while the order denying the earlier motion was pending in this court. Appellant appeals that order. In Wells v. State, 362 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), we held that the trial court could not rule on a second post-conviction motion to vacate a conviction, while an appeal was pending in this court from an order denying an earlier motion to vacate based on different grounds. See also Lee v. State, 392 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)(trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on second 3.850 motion where an order denying a prior 3.850 motion seeking relief on different grounds was on appeal); Hulick v. State, 644 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
The proposition that an appeal of an order denying a rule 3.850 motion prevents the trial court from ruling on a second 3.850 motion is based on the principle that a trial court has no power to rule on an issue which would interfere with the authority of the appellate court. Norman v. State, 739 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Crichlow v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 113 Fla. 668, 152 So. 849 (1933).
In Norman, the first district held that a trial court could rule on a 3.850 motion while an appeal was pending from a 3.800 motion, because the grounds in the 3.850 motion were not related in any way to the motion challenging the sentence. The present case is distinguishable from Norman and is controlled by Wells.
We note that the early cases addressing this issue such as Wells and Lee, were decided before the two year period of limitations for rule 3.850 motions became effective in 1985. The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 3.850), 460 So. 2d 907 (Fla.1984). The two year period will not be a problem for appellant because he was sentenced in December, 2000, and the appeal involving his first post-conviction motion has been affirmed. He can accordingly refile his second motion and still be within the time limit.
We recommend that when trial courts are precluded by a pending appeal from ruling on a second motion for post-conviction relief, the second motion be stayed rather than dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This would solve the problem created if the two year limitation period expires while the first appeal is pending, and could decrease post-conviction litigation.
We affirm without prejudice to the refiling of the second rule 3.850 motion.
Affirmed.
GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
-
Jackman v. State, 88 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…m was for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when it related to trial counsel and had correctly been filed in the circuit court. However, the procedural posture of Jackman’s motion causes us to reconsider our holding in Washington v. State, 823 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), that a trial court has no jurisdiction to rule on a subsequent rule 3.850 motion while an order denying a prior rule 3.850 motion, even one seeking relief on different grounds, was on appeal. Under Washington, we would be compe…
-
Perez v. State, 834 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…hat when the trial court is precluded by a pending appeal from ruling on a motion for post-conviction relief, the better procedure is to stay the post-conviction relief motion rather than dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. See Washington v. State, 823 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We recede from our prior opinion in Wilcher to the extent that it holds that the proper remedy is dismissal. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. POLEN, C.J., GUNTHER, STONE, WARNER, FARMER, KLEIN, STEVENSON, SHAHO…
-
Lindsay v. State, 842 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…ause Appellant’s direct appeal of the revocation of probation and resentencing was still pending. It is true that “a trial court has no power to rule on an issue which would interfere with the authority of the appellate court.” Washington v. State, 823 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). However, even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the instant motion because of the pending direct appeal, instead of dismissing the motion, as this court recently noted in Washington and Perez v. State, 834 S…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE FLA. BAR RE AMENDMENT TO RULES OF CRIM. PROCEDURE (RULE 3.850), 460 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1984)
- Crichlow v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 113 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1933)
- Wells v. State, 362 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Hulick v. State, 644 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Norman v. State, 739 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Rivers v. State, 392 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)