HUGO MIGUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
MARYANKA MIGUEZ, APPELLEE
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Hugo Miguez appealed a trial court's extension of a domestic violence injunction from one year to seven years, arguing that such duration is erroneous as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida law permits domestic violence injunctions of indefinite duration and that the trial court has broad discretion in setting injunction terms.
The court held that Florida Statutes section 741.30 permits domestic violence injunctions to remain in effect indefinitely until modified or dissolved, and that a seven-year injunction duration is not erroneous as a matter of law. However, the court affirmed on the narrower ground that without a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, it could not review whether the trial court abused its discretion.
[1] A domestic violence injunction, once entered, remains in effect until modified or dissolved by the court.
[2] A trial court has broad discretion in granting, denying, dissolving, or modifying injunctions, and appellate courts will not disturb such decisions absent a clear abuse o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an injunction 'shall remain in effect until modified or dissolved.' § 741.30(6)(b) Fla. Stat. (1997)”
Establishes that Florida law permits indefinite duration for domestic violence injunctions, not limited to one year
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn October 2000, the trial court granted the former wife's petition for a domestic violence injunction effective for one year. Five days before expira…
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PER CURIAM.
In October 2000, the trial court granted the former wife’s petition for a domestic violence injunction and made it effective for one year. The former wife filed a second petition for a domestic violence injunction five days before the expiration of the one-year injunction. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court extended the injunction for another seven years.
The former husband challenges the duration of the injunction and argues that an injunction effective for seven years is erroneous as a matter of law.
We disagree.
The trial court entered a permanent injunction pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (1997).
In 1997, the legislature removed the language that limited the duration of a permanent domestic violence injunction to one year. The amended statute now provides that an injunction “shall remain in effect until modified or dissolved.” § 741.30(6)(b) Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Fla. Fam. L.R.P. 12.610(c)(4)(B) (“Any relief granted by an injunction for protection against domestic or repeat violence shall be granted for a fixed period or until further order of the court.”).
Absent any language limiting the permissible duration of an injunction, the trial court could even have, if the circumstances warranted such, validly ordered a perpetual injunction rather than limit it to seven years. See Goodell v. Goodell, 421 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that an injunction restraining former spouses from harassing each other was valid and enforceable despite the absence of a time limit).
Regardless of its duration, the lower court can modify or dissolve a permanent injunction at any time where “the circumstances, and circumstances of the parties, are shown to have so changed as to make it just and equitable to do so, and especially where the decree itself reserves the right.” Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 7 So. 2d 143, 146 (1942).
Accordingly, the duration of the injunction is not defective on its face, and can only be challenged as an abuse of discretion. See Wise v. Schmidek, 649 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting, denying, dissolving, or modifying injunctions, and, unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will not disturb the trial court’s decision).
However, because there is neither a transcript of the evidentiary hearing nor a stipulated statement of the evidence pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(4), we are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. We must, therefore, affirm. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979); Stevens v. Bryan, 805 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“Without a record of the hearing, we cannot conclude that the injunction was not supported by the evidence .... ”). For the same reason, we cannot reverse on the basis of the former husband’s argument that the judgment is not supported by the evidence. As the former husband’s remaining point on appeal is without merit, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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Jackson v. Ladon Echols, 937 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…ence is necessary to provide meaningful appellate review of this issue, and the appellant has been unable to provide one, we are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, and, therefore, we must affirm. See Miguez v. Miguez, 824 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“[BJecause there is neither a transcript of the evidentiary hearing nor a stipulated statement of the evidence pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(4), we are unable to determine whether the trial court a…
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La Glenda Reed v. Giles, 974 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…PER CURIAM. La Glenda Reed, the appellant, seeks review of a trial court order denying her motion to dissolve a permanent injunction against domestic violence. Courts have broad discretion regarding injunctions. Miguez v. Miguez, 824 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (citing Wise v. Schmidek, 649 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). Reed has failed to demonstrate that there was an abuse of discretion. Miguez, 824 So. 2d at 258 (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (…
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COX v. Racquia Deacon, 82 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…o a period of one year, that provision was removed by the legislature in 1997. The current statute as amended provides for an injunction to “remain in effect until modified or dissolved.” § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Miguez v. Miguez, 824 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d [*828] DCA 2002). The court did not err in refusing to dissolve the injunction. Affirmed. WARNER, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ„ concur. . To the extent that he is challenging what occurred at the final judgment hearing, he has failed to pro…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Jackson Grain Co. v. LEE, 150 Fla. 232 (Fla. 1942)
- O'Brian v. State, 649 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Wise v. Schmidek, 649 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Goodell v. Goodell, 421 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Stevens v. Bryan, 805 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)